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Preface
This dissertation is the result of my Ph.D. studies at the Department of
Finance at the Copenhagen Business School. It consists of summaries in
English and Danish, an introduction and three self-contained essays on the
long-run performance of ﬁrms issuing new equity.
The dissertation, and my professional development at large, has bene-
ﬁted from the support and advice of many people. First and foremost, I
am indebted to my supervisor Søren Hvidkjær for his support and guidance
throughout the process. My secondary supervisor Ken Bechmann has read a
number of very preliminary draft and helped me sharpen ideas. Lasse Heje
Pedersen invited me to teach the course Hedge Fund Strategies together with
him, and helped me secure an internship at AQR Capital Management.
Moreover, I thank colleges, fellow Ph.D. students, and the numerous mas-
ter students, I have had the pleasure to teach and supervise, for making my
years at Copenhagen Business School so enjoyable.
There are things they don't teach you at a Business School - for example
how markets really work and how you make money on them. Fortunately, I
have spent time, actually a lot of time, hanging out with people who could
make op for this. Thorleif Jackson has taught me a lot about how you run a
small investment company and has introduced me to his network of investors
and fund managers. Numerous discussions with my business partner Jon
Forst has sharpened my understanding of, in particular, market making and
price dynamics in connection with corporate actions. I hope our joint struggle
to keep markets eﬃcient will remain joyful and proﬁtable.
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Finally, I thank my family, parents, children and in particular Lene for
support throughout the process.
Niklas Kohl
Copenhagen, September 2017
ii
Summary
Summary in English
Stock Issuance and the Speed of Price Discovery
Firms which issue new equity subsequently have lower returns than other
ﬁrms, but does the strength of the issuance eﬀect vary in the cross section of
ﬁrms? The essay shows, that US ﬁrms with characteristics that makes them
hard to value have returns which are strongly related to their past issuance
activity, while the return of easy to value ﬁrms are less related to their past
issuance activity. In most cases the diﬀerence between hard to value and
easy to value ﬁrms are signiﬁcant.
As proxies for hard to value, I use three diﬀerent types of ﬁrm char-
acteristics. First, I consider ﬁrms for which relatively little information is
available as hard to value. Examples are ﬁrms covered by few analysts and
small ﬁrms. Second, I consider ﬁrms with high levels of analyst disagreement
on stock price target, next quarter earnings per share and share recommen-
dation as hard to value. Third, ﬁrms with expected cashﬂows in the more
distant future are hard to value. These include ﬁrms with low earnings,
high asset growth, and low dividend yield.
As one possible explanation, consistent with the empirical results, I pro-
pose a model with informed investors receiving a noisy value signal, and other
investors who infer value from past market prices. I analyze the price dy-
namics after informed investors have received a new value signal (for instance
an issue announcement), and show that prices will converge to fundamental
iii
value, but convergence will be slowest when the value signal is most noisy,
i.e. for ﬁrms which are hard to value.
The Issuance Eﬀect in International Markets
The issuance eﬀect ﬁrst documented in the US market also exists in inter-
national markets, but does the strength of the issuance eﬀect vary in the
cross section of markets? The essay shows that the issuance eﬀect is stronger
in non-developed markets, i.e. markets not classiﬁed as developed by MSCI,
than in developed markets. If ﬁrms listed in non-developed markets are more
diﬃcult to value than ﬁrms listed in developed markets, then the result is
consistent with the hard to value hypothesis advocated in the essay Stock
Issuance and the Speed of Price Discovery.
The empirical results are inconsistent with those reported by McLean
et al. (2009) who ﬁnd a stronger issuance eﬀect in more developed markets
than in less developed markets.1 My essay shows, how their results are not
robust to minor methodological changes. I propose an alternative approach,
which arguably is better suited to explore diﬀerences in the issuance eﬀect in
the cross-section of markets. I show that this approach conﬁrms my empirical
results in several robustness tests.
Issue costs, ﬁnancial and otherwise, are likely to be higher in less devel-
oped markets than in more developed markets. The essay proposes a model
of the relationship between issue costs, issuance behavior and average long-
run performance of issuers. Higher levels of issue costs predict lower issuance
activity and lower long-run returns for issuers, consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings.
1The list of references is found at the end of the section Introduction.
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Does Information Asymmetry Explain Issuer Underperformance?
A prominent behavioral explanation for the low long-run returns of ﬁrms rais-
ing new equity through seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) holds, that oppor-
tunistic ﬁrms exploit information asymmetry at issue time to sell overvalued
equity Loughran and Ritter (1995). If this explanation holds, one would ex-
pect that the most overvalued issuers, and those which are least constrained
in the sense, that they do not need to issue to continue operations or service
current debt, have the best opportunities to exploit temporary windows of
mispricing. Therefore, issuers with these characteristics should experience
the lowest risk-adjusted returns subsequent to SEOs.
I derive proxies for overvaluation and issuer constrainedness and show,
empirically, that the most overvalued and least constrained US SEO ﬁrms
have similar or higher risk-adjusted long-run returns relative to issuers with-
out these characteristics. Consequently, I ﬁnd no evidence of information
asymmetry at issue time as explanation for long-run performance of SEO
ﬁrms.
As an alternative explanation, I propose that information asymmetry is
particularly low at event time because of the information requirements on
issuing ﬁrms and the incentives of issuers, investors, and intermediaries. In
this case, a possible explanation for the low returns subsequent to SEOs is,
that the marginal investor does not fully utilize all available information.
I measure the informational content of the SEO announcement using the
event return. Negative event returns are interpreted as bad news while
the rarer positive event returns are interpreted as good news. I show that,
empirically, event news, and in particular negative event news, predict long-
run return. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors underreact
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to available information, and that information is only gradually reﬂected in
prices, and that this process is slowest for bad news.
Dansk Resumé
Aktieemissioner og Priskonvergens
Selskaber som emitterer nye aktier har efterfølgende lavere afkast end andre
selskaber, men er der forskel på styrken af emittent eﬀekten mellem forskel-
lige typer af selskaber. Essayet viser en stærk sammenhæng mellem aktieud-
stedelse og efterfølgende afkast for selskaber som er svære at værdiansætte,
mens denne sammenhæng er meget svagere for selskaber som er lettere at
værdiansætte. I de ﬂeste tilfælde er forskellen mellem selskaber som er svære
at værdiansætte og selskaber som er lette at værdiansætte signiﬁkant.
Jeg bruger tre forskellige typer af proxier for svær at værdiansætte. For
det første, selskaber med relativt lidt tilgængelig information, for eksempel
selskaber som kun følges af få aktieanalytikere og små selskaber. For det
andet, selskaber hvor analytikerne er meget uenige om aktiens prismål, næste
kvartals indtjening og anbefaling på aktien. For det tredje, er selskaber med
forventet cashﬂow langt ude i fremtiden sværere at værdiansætte. Eksempler
på disse er selskaber med lav indtjening, høj vækst i aktivmassen og lave eller
ingen udbytter.
Som en mulig forklaring, konsistent med de empiriske resultater, foreslår
jeg en model med informerede investorer, som modtager et værdisignal med
støj og andre investorer som udleder værdi fra observerede markedspriser.
Jeg analyserer prisdynamikken efter at informerede investorer har modtaget
et nyt værdisignal (for eksempel en emissionsmeddelelse), og viser at aktiens
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pris vil konvergere mod den fundamentale værdi, men at konvergensen vil
være langsomst når værdisignalet har mest støj, dvs. for selskaber som er
svære at værdifastsætte.
Emittent Eﬀekten på Internationale Markeder
Emittent eﬀekten, som først blev påvist på det amerikanske marked, eksis-
terer også på internationale markeder (dvs. udenfor USA), men er der forskel
på styrken af eﬀekten mellem forskellige markeder? Essayet viser at emittent
eﬀekten er stærkere på ikke-udviklede markeder, dvs. markeder som ikke er
klassiﬁcerede som udviklede af MSCI, end på udviklede markeder. Hvis sel-
skaber noteret på ikke-udviklede markeder er sværere at værdiansætte end
selskaber noteret på udviklede markeder er dette resultat konsistent med
svær at værdiansætte hypotesen udviklet i mit essay Aktieemissioner og
Priskonvergens.
De empiriske resultater er inkonsistente med resultaterne i McLean et al.
(2009), som ﬁnder at emittent eﬀekten er stærkere på mere udviklende markeder
end på mindre udviklede markeder.2 Mit essay viser, at deres resultater ikke
er robuste i forhold til mindre metodemæssige ændringer. Jeg foreslår en
anden metode, som jeg mener er mere egnet til at vurdere emittent eﬀekten
på tværs af markeder. Jeg viser at denne metode bekræfter mine resultater
i forskellige robusthedstest.
Emissionsomkostninger, ﬁnansielle såvel som andre, et formodentlig hø-
jere på mindre udviklede markeder end på mere udviklede markeder. Essayet
foreslår en model for sammenhængen mellem emissionsomkostninger, emis-
sionsadfærd og emittenters gennemsnitlige langtids afkast. Højere emission-
2Se referencelisten i slutningen af afsnittet Introduction.
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somkostninger prædikterer lavere emissionsaktivitet og lavere langtids afkast
for emittenter, hvilket er konsistent med de empiriske resultater.
Forklarer Informationsasymmetri Emittenters Lave Afkast?
En prominent adfærdsteoretisk forklaring på det lave langtidsafkast for sel-
skaber som emitterer nye aktier er, at opportunistiske selskaber udnytter
informationsasymmetri på emissionstidspunktet til at sælge overvurderede
aktier (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Hvis denne forklaring holder, må det for-
ventes, at de mest overvurderede emittenter, og de emittenter der er mindst
begrænsede for så vidt at de ikke behøver at emittere for at fortsætte deres
drift eller servicere kortfristet gæld, har de bedste muligheder for at udnytte
midlertidige vinduer af forkert prisfastsættelse. Derfor bør selskaber med
disse karakteristika have de laveste risikojusterede afkast efter emissionen.
Jeg udvikler proxier for overvurdering og begrænsethed og viser empirisk,
at de mest overvurderede og mindst begrænsede amerikanske emittenter har
samme eller højere risikojusteret afkast som emittenter uden disse karakter-
istika. Følgelig ﬁnder jeg ikke belæg for at informationsasymmetri på emis-
sionstidspunktet forklarer langtidsafkast for emittenter.
Som alternativ forklaring foreslår jeg at informationsasymmetri er særligt
lav på emissionstidspunktet fordi emittenten skal opfylde informationsforplig-
telser og på grund af incitamenterne hos emittent, investorer og ﬁnansielle
formidlere. I så fald er en mulig forklaring på det lave afkast efter emission,
at den marginale investor ikke udnytter al tilgængelig information fuldt ud.
Jeg måler informationsindholdet af emissionsmeddelelsen med afkastet ved
emissionsmeddelelsens oﬀentliggørelse. Negative afkast opfattes som dårlige
nyheder og de sjældnere positive afkast opfattes som gode nyheder. Jeg
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viser empirisk, at afkast ved emissionsmeddelelsens oﬀentliggørelse, og især
negative afkast, prædikterer langtidsafkast. Dette er konsistent med at in-
vestorer underreagerer på tilgængelig information, og at information kun
gradvist afspejles i aktiens pris, og at denne proces er langsomst for dårlige
nyheder.
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three papers on stock issuance by listed ﬁrms.
The study of stock issuance is important because one of the primary functions
of the stock market is to enable ﬁrms to raise new equity to ﬁnance invest-
ments or operations. This takes place through initial public oﬀerings (IPOs),
but even more importantly through new equity issues by ﬁrms which are
already listed. According to Thomson Reuters (2017), global IPO activity in
2016 totaled $131 billion while seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) raised $448
billion. McKeon (2015) shows that US-listed ﬁrms raise a similar amount
in other issues. In total, global equity issuance activity raised around $1
trillion, and more than 80% of this was raised by listed ﬁrms.
SEOs refer to cases where the ﬁrm oﬀers new shares for cash, usually to
a group of selected investors, or pro rata to all current shareholders. Typi-
cally, the issue consists of at least 3% new shares, although larger issues are
commonplace (McKeon, 2015). SEOs are events in the sense that the issue is
announced and one can study return pre-event, when the event occurs, and
post-event. Other issues, including the exercise of employee stock options,
other warrants and convertible bonds, are much more frequent than SEOs
but individually much smaller. These issues are not generally announced
when they occur, but can only be inferred from quarterly reports or other
ﬁlings . New issues also occur in connection with stock-ﬁnanced mergers
where the acquiring ﬁrm purchases all or some stocks in the target ﬁrm and
pays with its own stocks.
It is well known that ﬁrms which issue new equity, on average, subse-
quently have high returns before the issue and low returns. In the third
paper, I show that the average US SEO ﬁrms overperform, relative to the
stock market, by more than 60% the year before issue and underperform by
more than 20% over the three years subsequent to issue.
The appreciation before issue has a number of plausible explanations.
It could reﬂect improved earnings prospects for the ﬁrm. To utilize these,
increased investments might be necessary, hence the issue of new equity.
Alternatively, the appreciation could be due to a reduction in required re-
turn, either market wide or for the particular ﬁrm, and either rationally or
otherwise. In any case, lower required returns mean that more investment
opportunities will move into positive net present value territory, hence the
ﬁrm will invest more and issue more to ﬁnance investments. Finally, if the
appreciation reﬂects mispricing, and ﬁrm management realize this, oppor-
tunistic ﬁrms may try to exploit the situation and sell overpriced equity to
new investors to the beneﬁt of old investors, possibly including themselves.
In the case of issues due to the exercise of employee stock options (or other
derivatives), average high returns before issue follow from the fact that these
are only exercised when they are in-the-money. This is most likely to take
place after the stock has appreciated. From an investor's perspective, the
appreciation before issue is not interesting, because we do not know which
ﬁrms will be next year's issuers.
The depreciation after issue is much more interesting. A key discussion
in ﬁnancial economics is to what extent ﬁnancial markets are eﬃcient in the
sense that prices reﬂect available information. The majority of research on
returns subsequent to issue takes a stance on this, either arguing that the
low returns subsequent to issue are a puzzle which cannot be explained by
a fully rational model or that returns are explained by known risk factors 
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or at least factors known to predict return in the cross-section of stocks, i.e.
there is no issuance puzzle. From an investor's perspective, the depreciation
after issue is of utmost importance: to the extent it reﬂects a deviation
from market eﬃciency, it provides trading opportunities. Even if it reﬂects
exposure to rationally priced risk-factors, investors need to decide whether
and to what extent they wish to be exposed to this risk.
My three papers seek to explore and test existing explanations and pro-
pose new explanations for the low returns subsequent to issue. The majority
of previous research aims to show that issuers underperform or do not under-
perform on a risk-adjusted basis subsequent to issue. However, my papers
diﬀer, in that I investigate whether there are issuer characteristics which de-
termine which issuers are likely to underperform. This is a useful approach,
because the ability to characterize the types of issuers which underperform
may help us understand the reasons for the underperformance regardless of
whether these are behavioral or explained by risk. From an investment per-
spective, it is also useful because it highlights the issuers which should be
avoided or possibly shorted and the issuers which can safely be purchased.
The ﬁrst paper Stock Issuance and the Speed of Price Discovery, focuses
on the issuance eﬀect, i.e. the extent to which past issuance activity (in SEOs
or otherwise) predicts future return in the cross section of listed US ﬁrms.
This has previously been performed by Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008) using
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology to measure the issuance eﬀect.
They report that past issuance activity is a strong and signiﬁcant predictor
of future return in the cross section of ﬁrms. The mentioned papers only
control for ﬁrm size and ﬁrm book-to-market ratio in the Fama-MacBeth
regressions. By now, it is well established that other factors predict future
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return. I add asset growth and proﬁtability. This is partly motivated by the
incorporation of these factors in the Fama French ﬁve-factor model Fama and
French (2015), but also by the fact that issuers and non-issuers are likely to
diﬀer substantially in terms of these characteristics. Firms issue for a reason
 and that reason is often because they need more equity due to poor prof-
itability or because they want to grow their asset base through investments.
Controlling for asset growth and proﬁtability reduces the issuance eﬀect sub-
stantially, i.e. a substantial part of the low return of issuers is explained by
the fact that they have high asset growth and low proﬁtability. This is partly
in line with Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), who ﬁnd that issuers and non-
issuers diﬀer in return-predicting characteristics beyond market value and
book-to-market ratio.
However, the important contribution of the paper is to study how the
issuance eﬀect varies in the cross-section of ﬁrms. The question is whether the
issuance eﬀect is stronger for some types of ﬁrm than for others. Empirically,
I show that the issuance eﬀect is strong and signiﬁcant among ﬁrms which
are hard to value but small and often insigniﬁcant among ﬁrms which are
easy to value. I use three diﬀerent types of proxies for hard to value  the
amount of information available, the extent to which equity analysts agree
on ﬁrm valuation, and whether expected cash-ﬂows are in the near or more
distant future. As one possible explanation, consistent with the empirical
results, I propose a model with informed investors receiving a noisy value
signal and other investors who infer value from past market prices. I study
the price dynamics after informed investors have received a new value signal
(for instance an issue announcement) and show that prices will converge to
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fundamental value, but convergence will be slowest when the value signal is
most noisy, i.e. for ﬁrms which are hard to value.
The second paper The Issuance Eﬀect in International Markets, considers
the issuance eﬀect in international markets. If the issuance eﬀect, at least
partly, reﬂects some sort of market ineﬃciency or friction, this might be
detectable in the cross section of international markets. It is natural to
hypothesize that the issuance eﬀect should be stronger in less developed, and
presumably less eﬃciently priced, markets than in more developed markets.
However, this hypothesis is at odds with the ﬁndings of McLean et al. (2009),
who ﬁnd that the issuance eﬀect is strongest in the most developed markets,
suggesting that this is because ﬁrms in developed markets can easily issue
and repurchase equity. Therefore, in developed markets, it is easy to be
opportunistic and exploit temporary mispricings. In less developed markets,
issues and repurchases are more expensive and issues will only occur for
primary reasons, i.e. not to exploit mispricings.
I ﬁnd this result troubling for two reasons. First, the reasoning assumes
that ﬁrms get away with opportunistic behavior on a large scale in the most
developed markets. Second, it is not at all clear that ﬁrms will refrain from
opportunistic issues just because it is expensive to issue. The paper ad-
dresses both these concerns. Theoretically, I show that issue costs do reduce
the frequency at which issues occur but do not prevent ﬁrms from attempt-
ing opportunistic issues. In fact, theoretically, the relation is opposite. In
markets with high issue costs long-run issuer underperformance should be
stronger than in markets with low issue costs. Empirically, I show that the
methodology employed by McLean et al. (2009) is highly sensitive to seem-
ingly arbitrary methodological choices. I suggest an alternative methodology,
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one which is arguably more suited to analyzing the issuance eﬀect in the cross
section of markets. The empirical result is that the issuance eﬀect is signif-
icantly stronger in non-developed markets than in developed markets. This
may be because of higher issue costs in non-developed markets, but the result
is also consistent with the hard to value hypothesis developed in my ﬁrst
paper.
While the ﬁrst two papers study the issuance eﬀect, i.e. how issuance
activity, whatever the form, predicts future return, the third paper focuses
on SEOs. The purpose is to explore whether information asymmetry between
ﬁrm management and investors at issue time can potentially explain long-run
performance. This idea is most explicitly advocated in Loughran and Ritter
(1995). If issuer underperformance is explained by opportunistic issues by
overvalued issuers this could potentially be detected with suitable proxies
for issuer overvaluation and proxies for whether issuers were in a position
where they could choose to issue or not to issue. The hypothesis is that ﬁrms
which are less ﬁnancially constrained have more room to be opportunistic in
their issuance behavior than ﬁrms for which an issue is necessary to ﬁnance
current operations or service current debt. Empirically, I ﬁnd no support
for information asymmetry as an explanation for issuer underperformance,
because the most overvalued issuers and the least ﬁnancially constrained
issuers do not have lower risk-adjusted long-run returns than less overvalued
and more constrained issuers.
The paper also considers the possibility that information asymmetry is
low at issue time. This is plausible due to information requirements in con-
nection with issues, ﬁrms' incentives to attract interest in the issue, and
investors' and intermediaries' interest in conducting their own independent
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research in connection with issues. Nonetheless, long-run underperformance
is possible if the marginal investor does not fully take the available infor-
mation into consideration. I show that this explanation is consistent with
empirical ﬁndings because event returns, and, in particular, negative event
return (bad news at event time), predict long-run returns. As always in
ﬁnancial economics, empirical ﬁndings lend support for diﬀerent interpreta-
tions. My empirical ﬁndings are that certain types of issuers, those with little
information available, those which analysts disagree about , those with most
of their expected cash-ﬂows in the distant future, those which are listed in
less developed markets, and those which experience the most negative event
returns when they announce a SEO, are more likely to subsequently under-
perform on a risk-adjusted basis. One possible explanation, developed in the
ﬁrst paper, is that some investors do not have or do not utilize all available
information, and the activities of more sophisticated investors, due to lim-
its of arbitrage, cannot immediately compensate fully for this, in particular
when the most sophisticated investors have the most negative valuation.
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Stock Issuance and the Speed of Price
Discovery
Niklas Kohl
*
Abstract
Firms which issue new equity subsequently have lower returns than
other ﬁrms. In this paper, I show that underperformance by issuers
is conﬁned to ﬁrms which are hard to value, while issuance activity
does not signiﬁcantly predict future returns for easy to value ﬁrms.
Hard to value ﬁrms include small cap, ﬁrms with high dispersion in
analyst estimates and recommendations, and ﬁrms with more distant
cash-ﬂows, such as ﬁrms with low proﬁtability, low dividend yield, or
high asset growth. Moreover, I show that only the negative component
of seasoned equity oﬀering (SEO) event returns signiﬁcantly predicts
one-year post-SEO returns. These results are consistent with a model
in which informed investors receive noisy signals of fundamental value
and shorting is constrained or costly.
∗Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Fred-
eriksberg, Denmark. E-mail: nk.ﬁ@cbs.dk. I am grateful for comments and suggestions
received from Søren Hvidkjær, Nigel Barradale, Ken Bechmann, Lasse Heje Pedersen, Ja-
nis Berzins as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School and the Nordic
Finance Network PhD Workshop 2016 in Bergen. Any errors remain mine.
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1 Introduction
Firms which issue new equity subsequently have lower returns than other
ﬁrms. This has been shown in the context of seasoned equity oﬀerings
(Loughran and Ritter (1995)) as well as for equity issuance in general (Daniel
and Titman (2006), Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), Fama and French (2008b),
Fama and French (2008a)). Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008) conclude that ...
post-SEO, post-repurchase, and post-stock merger return performance is part
of a broader share issuance eﬀect.
It is hardly surprising that ﬁrms which announce an issue of new shares,
on average, experience negative abnormal event returns. It is more challeng-
ing to explain why low returns persist for a longer period. Early research fo-
cused on behavioral explanations. According to Loughran and Ritter (1995)
ﬁrms issue equity when it is overvalued, but even if this is the case, an eﬃ-
cient market would capture this in the event return, as shown by Myers and
Majluf (1984). Consequently, delayed price discovery must also be at work to
explain subsequent underperformance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest
that ... companies announce stock issues when their stock is grossly over-
valued, the market does not revalue the stock appropriately, and the stock is
still substantially overvalued when the issue occurs.. This explanation ﬁnds
some empirical support in McLean et al. (2009), who ﬁnd evidence of market
timing in international stock issues, and Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008) who
conclude that ... it appears doubtful that these results can be explained
solely by a risk-based asset pricing model.
More recent papers have focused on risk-based explanations. Bessem-
binder and Zhang (2013) ﬁnd that the reported SEO underperformance is
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due to imperfect control-ﬁrm matching. When controlling for idiosyncratic
volatility, liquidity, momentum and investment, SEO abnormal returns be-
come insigniﬁcant. This is in line with Lyandres et al. (2008), who report
that around 75% of SEO underperformance is explained by an investment
factor. Fu and Huang (2015) document that abnormal returns following
stock repurchases and SEOs are insigniﬁcant during the period of 2003-2012.
According to the authors, this is because the pricing of stocks has become
more eﬃcient and ﬁrms less opportunistic in their behavior.
In this paper, I ﬁnd that a large portion of issuer performance is ex-
plained by exposure to factors beyond the Fama-French three factor model.
Nonetheless, some underperformance remains to be explained. I explore the
possibility that the negative abnormal returns associated with share issues
are due to investor underreaction to news conveyed in connection with the
issue. There may be several reasons for investor underreaction. For exam-
ple, investors may suﬀer from a conservatism bias (Barberis et al. (1998)),
investors may be inattentive during some time periods (Duﬃe (2010)), or
information may only diﬀuse gradually among investors (Hong and Stein
(1999)). In Hong et al. (2000), the diﬀusion hypothesis is tested empiri-
cally as an explanation for momentum. Information diﬀusion is expected
to be slowest for small ﬁrms, under-analyzed ﬁrms and for negative news.
Empirically, small ﬁrms, under-analyzed ﬁrms and past losers show stronger
momentum than other ﬁrms.
As a possible explanation for my empirical ﬁndings, I propose a model
in which some investors are informed in the sense that they observe a noisy
unbiased signal of the fundamental value whereas uninformed investors use
the last observed price as signal of the fundamental value. Trading takes
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place when informed investors and uninformed investors disagree on value.
If the value signal received by informed investors remains constant, the price
will converge to an equilibrium price reﬂecting the signal received by in-
formed investors. The speed of convergence to equilibrium depends on the
fraction of informed investors and the noise of the signal received. In partic-
ular, price discovery will be slowest for noisy signals and small numbers of
informed investors. Moreover, the model predicts that shorting constraints
will increase the speed of price discovery when the equilibrium price is above
current price, i.e. for good news, but decrease the speed of price discovery
when equilibrium price is below current price, i.e. for bad news.
I apply the model to the case of issuance and show that, empirically, only
ﬁrms which are hard to value underperform signiﬁcantly subsequent to
stock issues. I consider three types of proxies for hard to value. First, ﬁrms
for which less information is available are likely to be more diﬃcult to value
than ﬁrms for which more information is available. For example, in Fama-
MacBeth regressions, past issuance activity signiﬁcantly predicts next month
return in the quintile of ﬁrms followed by fewest analysts, excluding ﬁrms not
followed by any analysts, while past issuance activity is insigniﬁcant for the
quintile of ﬁrms followed by most analysts. t-statistics are -1.99 and -2.94
depending on controls. In the quintile of ﬁrms with smallest market value,
past issuance is signiﬁcant with t-statistics of -5.68 and -5.72 but insigniﬁcant
in the quintile of ﬁrms with highest market value.
Second, I consider dispersion in analyst estimates and recommendations
as proxies for diﬃculty to value. For example, in the quintile of ﬁrms with the
highest dispersion in analyst price targets, past issuance activity signiﬁcantly
predicts next month return (t-statistics -2.50 and -2.70) but is insigniﬁcant
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for the quintile of ﬁrms with the lowest dispersion in analyst price targets.
Third, I consider ﬁrms with more distant cash-ﬂows to be more diﬃcult to
value than ﬁrms with cash-ﬂows in the closer future. As an example, past
issuance activity signiﬁcantly predicts next month return (t-statistics -2.17
and -2.73) in the lowest return on equity quintile but is insigniﬁcant among
the ﬁrms with the highest return on cash-ﬂow.
I show these results in Fama-MacBeth regressions with past issuance ac-
tivity as a continuous variable as well as with dummy variables correspond-
ing to diﬀerent levels of issue activity and with double sorted calendar-time
portfolios. In most speciﬁcations, past issuance activity signiﬁcantly predicts
return for hard to value ﬁrms but only rarely for easy to value ﬁrms.
Moreover, I show that negative stock market reaction to SEO events, i.e.
bad news, in some speciﬁcations is signiﬁcantly associated with long-run
negative abnormal returns, whereas positive event returns, i.e. good news
is not associated with long-run abnormal returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a
model of asset prices with informed and uninformed investors is presented
and predictions of the model in general and in the context of issuance are
discussed. The empirical strategy and data are presented in Section 3. I ap-
ply three diﬀerent methods. Results from Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama
and MacBeth (1973)) and portfolios constructed based on two-dimensional
sorts are presented in Section 4 and Section 5. In Section 6, I analyze the
relation between event returns and long-run returns for SEO ﬁrms. Section 7
concludes.
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2 Asset Prices with Informed and Uninformed
Investors
This section presents a simple model of price discovery in a world with in-
formed and uninformed investors. Informed investors observe a noisy signal
of fundamental value while uninformed investors only observe the most re-
cent market value of a risky asset. The model shows that the speed of price
discovery depends on the fraction of informed investors and the level of noise
on the value signal. The latter provides motivation for the empirical ﬁndings
of this paper. Price discovery is slowest for assets which are hardest to value.
2.1 Model
Consider an economy with investors of which the fraction τ ∈ ]0, 1[, are
informed and 1− τ are uninformed. All investors have absolute risk aversion
parameter a. There is one risky asset in limited supply and a risk-free asset
with zero return in unlimited supply. Assets can be traded in any fraction.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the supply of risky assets equals
the number of investors. The risky asset is traded at discrete times and the
market clearing price is denoted Pt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Immediately before time t informed investors learn that the fundamen-
tal value of the risky asset is normally distributed with mean µi,t and time
independent variance σ2i > 0. Uninformed investors believe that the time
t value of the risky asset is normally distributed with mean µu,t and time
independent variance σ2u > 0. Uninformed investors calculate µu,t based on
the most recent observed price Pt−1. The reasons for this are given below.
By deﬁnition, investors' expected return on the risky asset is Et(R) =
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µt−Pt
Pt
with variance Vart(R) = σ
2
P 2t
, where µt is µi,t for informed investors
and µu,t otherwise, and similarly σ is either σi or σu. Hence, their optimal
investment in the risky asset is Et(R)
a Vart(R) =
Pt(µt−Pt)
a σ2
.
While informed investors know µt and σ, uninformed investors believe
that the expected value of the risky asset is fully revealed by the last ob-
served price Pt−1 and that no other investors have information other than
themselves. Speciﬁcally, they assume that all investors are like themselves
and that the last observed price Pt−1 is consistent with investors' valuation.
Market clearing implies that each investor should hold one risky asset, i.e.
Pt−1(µu,t − Pt−1)
a σ2u
= Pt−1
with the solution
µu,t = Pt−1 + aσ2u (1)
In other words, uninformed investors believe that the value of the risky
asset equals the last observed price plus the risk premium they require for
holding the risky asset. While this belief is not consistent with rational expec-
tations, because it ignores the presence of informed investors, it is consistent
with the eﬃcient market hypothesis, in the sense that uninformed investors
assume that the last observed price incorporates all available information.1
Demand from informed investors plus demand from uninformed investors
must equal total supply. Hence, time t market clearing requires that2
1Uninformed rational expectations investors would realize that the price path
P0, P1, . . . Pt−1 contains information about the signals received by informed investors and
would take this information into account when forming their beliefs.
2Here, I utilize that there are nτ informed investors, n(1 − τ) uninformed investors,
and a supply of n risky assets, where n is the number of investors. None of the results
depend on the size of n.
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(1− τ) Pt(µu,t − Pt)
a σ2u
+ τ
Pt(µi,t − Pt)
a σ2i
= Pt
with the solution
Pt = µu,t +
stτ − Σaσ2u
Σ(1− τ) + τ (2)
where Σ =
σ2i
σ2u
denotes the ratio between variance of valuation of informed
investors and uninformed investors. Σ measures the precision of the signal
received by informed investors relative to variance perceived by uninformed
investors. st = µi,t − µu,t is the time t spread between informed and un-
informed investors' expected value of the risky asset. If the signal received
by informed investors remains constant, i.e. µi,t = µi for t ≥ T a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium is Pt = Pt−1. Insertion of this con-
dition and the uninformed investors' valuation formula from equation 1 in
equation 2 yields
Pt = Pt + aσ
2
u +
stτ − Σaσ2u
Σ(1− τ) + τ ⇒ st = aσ
2
u(Σ− 1) (3)
By deﬁnition, µi = µu,t + st. Inserting µu,t from equation 1 and st from
equation 3 and using the deﬁnition of Σ and the equilibrium condition Pt =
Pt−1 yields the equilibrium price P ∗ = µi−aσ2i . It depends only on informed
investors' expected value and variance. In equilibrium investors do not agree
on expected value unless Σ = 1, but any disagreement will be oﬀset by
disagreement on variance.
Consider a situation in which informed investors receive a new and con-
stant value signal µi,t = µi for t ≥ T . This creates a new equilibrium price,
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but the question of interest is under what conditions and how fast this equi-
librium will be reached. Proposition 1 shows that Pt will always converge
linearly to the equilibrium price P ∗.
Proposition 1.
If µi,t = µi for all t ≥ T then Pt → P ∗ for t→∞
The rate of convergence is Σ(1−τ)
Σ(1−τ)+τ .
Proof.
See Appendix A.
By proposition 1, the rate of convergence depends only on Σ and τ . Since
the partial derivatives
∂γ
∂Σ
=
τ − τ 2
Λ2
> 0
∂γ
∂τ
=
−Σ
Λ2
< 0
convergence is faster for higher fractions of informed investors τ and for lower
levels of noise of the value signal Σ received by informed investors.
We may augment the model with constraints on shorting. Some investors
may be unable or unwilling to short and those who can and will, may face
costs associated with shorting and limitations due to margin requirements
and lending fees.
If P ∗ > Pt−1 informed investors will be buyers and uninformed investors
will be sellers and potential shorters. If unconstrained uninformed investors
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would have taken short positions, introduction of shorting constraints would
increase their demand and thus price. This, in turn, will increase µu,t above
what it would otherwise have been, and increase the demand from uninformed
investors until the shorting constraints are no longer binding.
An equilibrium where only informed investors hold the risky asset is not
possible. In such an equilibrium, uninformed investors must have negative
demand. This requires µu,t ≤ Pt. But by equation (1) µu,t = Pt−1 + aσ2u, so
an equilibrium is impossible when a > 0 and σ2u > 0. Consequently, shorting
constraints on uninformed investors will decrease their impact on prices, and
thus increase the speed of price discovery.
If P ∗ < Pt−1 the potential shorters are informed investors. If shorting
constraints are binding, prices will be higher than they would otherwise have
been, and the speed of price discovery will decrease. Even if shorting is
impossible, an equilibrium where only uninformed investors hold the risky
asset, and price discovery does not occur, is impossible. If uninformed in-
vestors hold all risky assets, market clearing implies that Pt = µu,t − aσ2u1−τ =
Pt−1− τaσ2u1−τ . Consequently, the price will decline provided a > 0, σ2u > 0, and
τ ∈ ]0, 1[.
Summing up, the model predicts that price discovery will always occur
but be slowest for shares traded by few informed investors and for shares
which are hard to value by informed investors. Shorting constraints will
increase the speed of price discovery for good news, i.e. when P ∗ > Pt, but
decrease the speed of price discovery for bad news, i.e. when P ∗ < Pt.
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2.2 Application to Issuance
Large share issues, as well as share repurchases, are known to be information-
conveying events. This has been documented in numerous event studies
showing that SEO announcements, on average, are greeted with negative
abnormal event returns, whereas repurchase announcements are greeted with
positive abnormal event returns (see Eckbo et al. (2007) for a survey of studies
of SEOs and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) for repurchases).
For the case of share issuance, McKeon (2015) shows that 90% of quar-
ters in which ﬁrms issue new shares, the issuance was not initiated by the
ﬁrm but rather by investors, in particular through the exercise of employee
stock options. These issues are generally small and unlikely to convey much
information. In contrast, larger issues, often associated with SEOs or stock
ﬁnanced acquisitions, are ﬁrm-initiated and likely to convey information.
The model outlined in Section 2.1, predicts that larger share issues will
be positively associated with future negative abnormal returns, because they
on average convey negative information. Smaller issues are less likely to be
associated with abnormal returns, as the information conveyed by smaller
issues, in particular investor-initiated issues, is limited. Empirically, this
is consistent with Fama and French (2008a) who ﬁnd that large issues are
associated with signiﬁcant negative future abnormal returns, whereas small
issues are associated with insigniﬁcant positive future abnormal returns.
Repurchase announcements may convey substantial positive information,
but the model predicts that it will be absorbed by the market faster than
negative information. Hence, it is less likely that share repurchases will be
associated with signiﬁcant future abnormal returns.
A novel prediction of the model is that the speed of price discovery will be
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slowest for hard to value ﬁrms trading above their fundamental value, such
as hard to value ﬁrms with large equity issues. As hard to value is not
directly observable, I consider three types of proxies for this property. First,
I consider ﬁrms for which less information is publicly available. I measure
the amount of public information by the ﬁrm's market value, because small
ﬁrms disclose less information, and by the number of equity analysts following
a ﬁrm. Second, I consider ﬁrms with high disagreement in analyst opinion.
Here, I calculate dispersion in analyst price target, recommendation, and next
quarter EPS estimate. Third, partly inspired by Baker and Wurgler (2007),
I consider ﬁrms with more distant cash-ﬂows. Firms with more distant cash-
ﬂows are harder to value, because there is more uncertainty associated with
the more distant future. Firms with distant cash-ﬂows are ﬁrms with low
proﬁtability, measured as return on equity, ﬁrms with low dividend yield,
ﬁrms with high asset growth, and ﬁrms with low earnings to price ratio.
All these measures may arguably be proxies for diﬃculty to value, but
may also be correlated with other characteristics known to predict return.
In particular, market value, proﬁtability, asset growth and the earnings to
price ratio are all known to predict return. As an example, the model pre-
dicts that low proﬁtability issuers will underperform relative to issuers with
higher proﬁtability because they are harder to value. But the underperfor-
mance may also be caused directly by the lower proﬁtability. I address these
concerns in two ways. First, I also use proxies which are not obviously corre-
lated with return-predicting characteristics. Second, and more importantly,
in the Fama-MacBeth regressions in Section 4, I control for all the return-
predicting characteristics of the Fama and French (2015) ﬁve factor model as
well as momentum and in the double sorted portfolio regressions reported in
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Section 5, I regress returns on the Fama French ﬁve factor returns.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Measures of Issuance
My gross sample consists of all shares on the monthly CRPS ﬁle during the
period from 1985 to 2014 for which price prc or alternate price altprc and
monthly return with and without dividends (ret and retx) are available.3
Following some previous research (including Eckbo et al. (2007), Fama and
French (2008a), and Bessembinder and Zhang (2013)), I leave out ﬁnancial
ﬁrms.4
To measure issuance activity, I monthly calculate the adjusted number of
shares using the number of shares outstanding (shrout) and the cumulative
factor to adjust shares (cfacshr) reported by CRSP. Observations for which
the number of shares and cumulative factor to adjust shares are not available
are dropped from the sample. Following Daniel and Titman (2006) net issue
over the past year is deﬁned as
NetIssuet,t−12 = ln(AdjustedSharest)− ln(AdjustedSharest−12)
where AdjustedSharest is the time t adjusted number of shares. To distinguish
between positive issuance and negative issuance (repurchases), I deﬁne
Issuet,t−12 = max(NetIssuet,t−12, 0)
3Here and in the following variable names in CRSP and Compustat and other databases
are given in courier.
4Some papers, including Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Daniel and Titman (2006)
leave out utilities.
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and
Repurchaset,t−12 = max(−NetIssuet,t−12, 0)
To simplify notation Issue, Repurchase, and NetIssue refer to Issuet,t−12,
Repurchaset,t−12, and NetIssuet,t−12, respectively.
In some empirical tests, ﬁrm-month observations are sorted into issuance
portfolios on NetIssue value. These portfolios are denoted issue1, issue2,
issue3, issue4, and issue5, respectively. The breakpoints used are ﬁxed to fa-
cilitate the interpretation of the portfolios. issue1 consists of net repurchasers
with NetIssue < −0.1%. issue2 is zero-issuers with −0.1% ≤ NetIssue <
0.1%. issue3, issue4, and issue5 are net issuers with NetIssue of at least
0.1%, 3% and 15%, respectively. The 3% breakpoint is motivated by McK-
eon (2015) who ﬁnds that issues of at least 3% are typically ﬁrm-initiated.
The 15% breakpoint is chosen to separate ﬁrm-initiated issues in two groups
of approximately same size.
The number of ﬁrms per NetIssue portfolio is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2
shows that zero-issuers have become less common and that the number of re-
purchasers varies strongly over time. In particular, it seems that the number
repurchasers spikes in the period after major stock downturns, for example
year 1988, after the dot-com bubble in year 2000, after the 2008 Financial
crisis, and after the August 2011 stock market fall. Since repurchase is mea-
sured over the past year, a possible interpretation is that some ﬁrms utilize
the low valuations to repurchase own equity.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Table 1 provides statistics for each of the ﬁve NetIssue portfolios. In terms
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of ﬁrm-month observations, issue3, the portfolio with small positive issuance
activity, accounts for 36% of all observations. There are 20% repurchasers
(issue1), 15% zero-issuers (issue2) and 16% and 12% in issue4 and issue5,
the two groups with high issuance activity. Zero-issuers are, on average, the
smallest ﬁrms, issuers are larger and repurchasers the largest ﬁrms. BM is
highest for zero-issuers and lowest for ﬁrms with high issuance activity. ROE
and EP are, as one would expect, monotonically decreasing in NetIssue while
AG in increasing in NetIssue.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
One of my empirical tests focuses on SEO ﬁrms. I obtain information on
SEOs from the Thomson One Banker New Issues Database (SDC Platinum).
I selected Follow-On equity issues with total proceeds of at least 3% of the
total pre-issue market value. Most of the issues eliminated are oﬀerings
of shares by major shareholders. These issues may be large but are not
ﬁrm-initiated and do not change ﬁrm equity. The Figure 3% is motivated
by McKeon (2015), as discussed above. SEO observations are merged with
CRSP observations on cusip number and ﬁrm name.
3.2 Proxies for hard to value
As discussed in Section 2.2, I use nine diﬀerent proxies for hard to value.
These proxies are calculated monthly. Market value, denoted MV, is cal-
culated from CRPS data. For ﬁrms (permcos) with more than one share
class (more than one permno) issued, only the share class with the highest
market value is kept, but the ﬁrm's market value is aggregated over all share
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classes. Dividend yield, denoted Yield, over the past 12 months is calculated
as CRSP holding period return (ret) over the past 12 months less holding
period return without dividend (retx) over the past 12 months.
For the calculation of return on equity (ROE), asset growth (AG), and
earnings to price ratio (EP), accounting data from Compustat are used. I
use only data from annual reports. The most recent Compustat observation,
at least six months old and no more than two years older than the CRSP
observation, is used. AG is calculated as the relative change in assets (at)
over the past 12 months. ROE is calculated as net income (ni) divided by
book equity (ceq) and EP is calculated as net income divided by market
value. CRSP observations, for which Compustat accounting information
(assets, net income and book equity) is not available, are omitted.
Data on equity analysts and their recommendations are from the IBES
database. The most recent IBES observation, no more than one year old, is
used. The number of analysts with a next quarter earnings per share (EPS)
estimate is denoted #Analysts. Three measures of analyst disagreement are
calculated for ﬁrms with at least two analyst observations. Dispersion in
analyst price target (PTG) is given by
Dptg =
σptg
µptg
where σptg and µptg is the standard deviation and mean of analyst price
targets reported by IBES. Dispersion in analyst recommendation (REC) Drec
is the standard deviation in recommendation, measured on a ﬁve-point scale,
reported by IBES. Dispersion in analyst expected next quarter earnings per
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share EPS is scaled with price, i.e.
Deps =
σeps
P
where σeps is the standard deviation of analysts' next quarter EPS estimate
and P is the price per share. While CRSP observations without correspond-
ing accounting data are dropped, observations without analyst information
are kept in the sample. Figure 1 shows the number of ﬁrms for which at least
one estimate of next quarter EPS, at least one price target, and at least one
recommendation, are available. EPS estimates start around the year 1985
and coverage gradually increases until around year 2000. Analyst recommen-
dations start becoming available from the year 1995 and price targets from
year 2000. By the end of the sample, more than 80% of the ﬁrms have EPS
estimates, recommendations and price targets.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Since analyst recommendations and price targets are not available from
1985, the empirical test using analyst recommendations covers the period
1995-2014 while test using analyst price targets cover the period 2000-2014.
3.3 Empirical Tests
In order to explore to what extent the predictions of the model presented in
Section 2 can be conﬁrmed empirically, I have performed three types of tests.
First, in Section 4, I do one dimensional sorts on each of the nine vari-
ables proxying for hard to value and create quintile samples. Portfolios are
constructed monthly. As customary breakpoints are calculated using NYSE
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ﬁrms only. Within each quintile sample, I apply Fama-MacBeth regressions
(Fama and MacBeth (1973)) to determine whether issuance is signiﬁcantly
associated with next month returns for the hard to value quintile sample
as well as for the easy to value quintile sample.
Second, in Section 5, I create ﬁve by ﬁve double sorted portfolios. One
of the sort variables is NetIssue, sorted into portfolios as described in Sec-
tion 3.1, the other is one of the variables proxying for hard to value. With
nine diﬀerent proxy variables, this gives nine diﬀerent sets of ﬁve by ﬁve
portfolios. For each of the double sorted portfolios, value-weighted monthly
return is calculated and regressed on conventional market and factor returns
reported on the Kenneth French website. This is to determine whether the
spread in regression intercept between repurchasers (issue1) and larger is-
suers (issue5) diﬀers between ﬁrms which are easy to value and ﬁrms which
are hard to value.
Third, in Section 6, I focus on ﬁrms which, according to the Thomson
SDC database, have carried out a SEO. For SEO ﬁrms, there has been an
SEO announcement, with an associated event return ER. ER can be de-
composed into its positive component, denoted ER+ = max(ER, 0) and its
negative component, denoted ER− = max(−ER, 0). I interpret ER as a
proxy for the information conveyed in the SEO announcement. On average,
it will be negative, but in the cross-section of ﬁrms it will diﬀer, and for some
issuers it will be positive. By regressing one-year buy and hold abnormal re-
turns (BHAR), calculated from two weeks after the SEO to one year after the
SEO, on ER+ and ER−, I test whether bad news (ER−) and positive news
(ER+), respectively, predict one-year abnormal returns. Finally, I construct
monthly updated value-weighted calendar-time portfolios of issuers with pos-
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itive event return and issuers with negative event returns. Portfolio returns
are regressed on conventional market and factor returns and I test whether
regression intercepts diﬀer from zero and between the two portfolios.
4 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Table 2 reports full-sample Fama-MacBeth regressions of next month return
on ﬁrm characteristics expected to explain return including the characteris-
tics Issue and Repurchase. Two market models are considered: a minimal
model with only the logarithm of ratio between book value and market value
(bm) and the logarithm of market value5 (mv) and a comprehensive model
which also includes return over the past 12 months excluding the last month
(MOM), return on equity (ROE), and asset growth (AG). All regressors,
except for mv and MOM are winsorized at their 1% and 99% fractiles, re-
spectively.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As expected, ROE and AG are highly signiﬁcant. With both market
models Issue is also highly signiﬁcant, with a coeﬃcient of about -0.8. This
implies that a 10% increase in Issue is associated with a 8 bps reduction
in next month return. Repurchase is less signiﬁcant but with a higher re-
gression coeﬃcients (2.5 with bm and mv as independent variables and 1.3
if MOM, ROE and AG are included). Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), who
do not decompose NetIssue into Issue and Repurchase, report that in a uni-
variate regression a 15% increase in NetIssue is associated with a 33 bps
5i.e. bm = log(BM) and mv = log(MV )
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decrease in next month return. This is equivalent to a regression coeﬃcient
of (numerically) 2.2 in my regressions.
In the rest of this section, ﬁrm-month observations are sorted in quintile
portfolios based on variables proxying for hard to value. For each quintile
porfolio, I run separate value-weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions using the
same ﬁrm characteristics as in Table 2. The purpose is to determine for
which samples Issue and Repurchase signiﬁcantly predict return.
With nine diﬀerent proxies for hard to value, ﬁve portfolios for each
of these and two market models, the number of regressions is 90. Table 3
provides a summary of the level of signiﬁcance of Issue and Repurchase for
the most easy and most hard to value quintile samples. In 15 of the 18 cases
Issue is signiﬁcant for the most hard to value quintile samples but never for
the most easy to value quintile samples. Repurchase is signiﬁcant in eight
cases for the hard to value samples and twice for the easy to value samples.
Table 4 reports the details of all 90 regressions.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results reported are consistent with the predictions of the model
discussed in Section 2. Issue only predicts return signiﬁcantly for hard to
value ﬁrms. Further, Issue is more frequently able to predict future return
than Repurchase. The latter is consistent with the prediction that price
discovery will be slower after bad news (stock issues) than after good news
(stock repurchases).
Fama-MacBeth regressions impose an aﬃne relationship between expected
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return and the independent variables, including Issue and Repurchase. If this
relationship has another functional form, as the discussion in Section 2.2 and
the empirical ﬁndings of Fama and French (2008b) suggest, it is not possible
to make inferences from diﬀerences in regression coeﬃcients between quintile
portfolios. To illustrate this point, I show, in Figure 3, the coeﬃcients as-
sociated with issue portfolio dummy variables in full-sample Fama-MacBeth
regressions. This regression is equivalent to the full-sample regressions re-
ported in Table 2, with the exception that Issue and Repurchase have been
replaced with dummy variables: issue1 for repurchasers and issue3, issue4
and issue5 for issuers using the same breakpoints as above. The base category
is zero-issuers.
The dummy variable associated with repurchases (issue1) as well as small
issues (issue3) is positive relative to the group of zero-issuers, i.e. repurchases
as well as small issues are associated with higher returns than zero-issues,
in line with ﬁndings reported in Fama and French (2008b). Larger issues
(issue4 and issue5) are associated with more negative returns. Only estimates
associated with issue5 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (t-statistics of 2.21
and 2.23 respectively), but the results suggest that the relationship between
NetIssue and return may not be aﬃne.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
If easy to value ﬁrms are less likely to do large issues than hard to value
ﬁrms, it would be no surprise that Issue signiﬁcantly predicts return for hard
to value ﬁrms but not for easy to value ﬁrms. Since cash-ﬂows in the more
distant future, i.e. low proﬁtability, low earnings to price ratio, and high
growth, are proxies for hard to value, this a very real concern, because these
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types of ﬁrms are more likely to issue than ﬁrms with stronger current cash-
ﬂows. To address this concern, I repeat the Fama-MacBeth regressions within
separate samples sorted on variables proxying for hard to value, using issue
dummy variables issue1, issue3, issue4, and issue5 instead of Repurchase and
Issue.
The results of the issue dummy variable regressions are summarized in
Table 5. The table reports whether issue5 (Issue above 15%) and issue1
(Repurchase of at least 0.1%) are signiﬁcant relative to the base category
(zero-issuers). In 12 out of 18 cases of hard to value ﬁrms, the return of large
issuers (issue5) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the return of zero-issuers, while
this is never the case for easy to value ﬁrms. The dummy variable associated
with repurchases (issue1) is signiﬁcant in 10 of 18 cases of hard to value ﬁrms
and three times for easy to value ﬁrms. These results are less signiﬁcant
than the results with Issue and Repurchase as regressors, suggesting that
the results reported in Table 3 are biased due to diﬀerent issuance activity
between the easy to value and the hard to value samples for some of the
proxies for hard to value.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
5 Double Sorted Portfolio Returns
Another concern with the assumptions of the Fama-MacBeth regressions is
that issuance may be correlated with other independent variables, as strongly
suggested by Table 1. If this is the case and expected return is not aﬃne
in these independent variables, inference from comparisons between Fama-
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MacBeth regressions on diﬀerent samples is aﬀected. An alternative to Fama-
MacBeth regressions is to construct portfolios and regress portfolio returns on
the return on factors known to predict return. Speciﬁcally, I use the factor
returns available from Kenneth French's website. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not impose any functional form of the relationship
between return and independent variables.
Figure 4 illustrates the importance of the choice of market model in sort
portfolio tests. The ﬁgure reports monthly α's of the ﬁve value-weighted port-
folios corresponding to issue1, issue2, issue3, issue4, and issue5 regressed on
the market excess return (panel A), the Fama French three factor returns (de-
noted FF3, panel B), and Fama French ﬁve factor returns plus momentum
return (denoted FF5+UMD, panel C). Market and FF3 α's decrease mono-
tonically from repurchasers to issuers. Controlling for proﬁtability, growth
and momentum changes this picture fundamentally. FF5+UMD α's for re-
purchasers and zero-issuers are close to 0, while small and midsized issues are
associated with positive abnormal returns and only large issues are associated
with negative abnormal returns. This may partly explain why Bessembinder
and Zhang (2013) ﬁnd that SEO underperformance disappears when con-
trols beyond book-to-market ratio and ﬁrm size are added. Note, however,
that ﬁrms with the largest issuance activity are much less aﬀected by the
introduction of factors beyond market exposure, and have negative α's in all
cases.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Since my main interest is whether underperformance by issuers is con-
ﬁned to ﬁrms which are hard to value, I have create double sorted portfolios
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where NetIssue is one sort variable and the other sort variable is a proxy
for hard to value. For each of the double sorted portfolios, value-weighted
monthly return is calculated and regressed on the FF3 and the FF5+UMD
market models. The regression intercept αki,j is the abnormal return of the
intersection between NetIssue portfolio i and portfolio j of sort variable k.
For example, αMV1,1 is the abnormal return of a portfolio of small cap share re-
purchasers (issue1) and αROE5,1 is the abnormal return on a portfolio of small
cap ﬁrms with high issuance activity (issue5). The variable of interest is
the diﬀerence in regression intercept between a portfolio of high issuers and
a portfolio of repurchasers, within the same quintile of the hard to value
variable. This diﬀerence is denoted the issuance spread
∆kj = α
k
1,j − αk5,j
For example, ∆MV1 is the diﬀerence in abnormal return between small cap
repurchasers and small cap issuers, while ∆MV5 is the same diﬀerence for large
cap ﬁrms. I test whether the issuance spread is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for hard to value portfolios as well as for easy to value portfolios.
Figure 5 depicts the monthly α's of value-weighted portfolios sorted on
NetIssue and MV regressed on FF5+UMD. Within the group of small cap
ﬁrms, repurchasers have an α of 36 bp, while ﬁrms with the largest issuance
activity (issue5) have an α of -22 bp. The diﬀerence between these is the
issuance spread ∆MV1 = 58 bps, which is signiﬁcant with a t-value of 3.13.
It can be interpreted as the abnormal return on an investment which is long
small cap repurchasers and short small cap large issuers. If α's are measured
relative to FF3, ∆MV1 = 110 bps with a t-value of 5.51. For large cap ∆
MV
5
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is -14 bps for the FF5+UMD model and 14 bps for the FF3 model, both of
these are insigniﬁcant.
Table 6 shows the issuance spread for the most easy to value and the
most hard to value ﬁrms for each of the nine variables proxying for diﬃculty
to value and the two market models FF3 and FF3+UMD. For the easy to
value ﬁrms, the issuance spread is only signiﬁcant in one case, while it is
signiﬁcant in 13 out of 18 cases for the hard to value ﬁrms. Issuance spreads
are uniformly larger when returns are regressed on the FF3 model than when
regressed on the FF5+UMD model, again conﬁrming that some of the un-
derperformance of issuers is explained by exposure to the RMW, CMA and
UMD factors.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
6 Returns Subsequent to SEOs
This section focuses on ﬁrms which, according to SDC Platinum, have carried
out an SEO. One advantage of focusing on SEOs is that we can calculate event
returns. Abnormal event returns can be taken as a proxy for the information
conveyed in connection with the issue. Most previous research ﬁnds that
abnormal event returns on average are negative ((Eckbo et al., 2007)), but
occasionally they will be positive. These events convey positive information
about the issuing ﬁrm. This enables me to test the model prediction, namely
that the speed of price discovery is faster for good news than for bad news,
cf. Section 2.
In the SDC Platinum database I select all SEOs (Follow-On oﬀerings)
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by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms between 1985 and 2014 where the proceeds from the
oﬀering exceed 3% of the market value before the oﬀering. SDC observations
are matched with CRSP and Compustat data using the cusip code and the
ﬁrm name. Return information must be available in CRSP.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6 shows the value-weighted cumulated return of SEO ﬁrms less
the market return from 10 trading days before the issue date (T ) until 10
trading days after the issue date6.
Before issues, issuers experience positive abnormal returns (relative to
the market) of around 1%. This is not necessarily surprising, as ﬁrms may
chose to issue when they perceive their own shares to be performing strongly.
From the day before the issue to two days after the issue, SEO ﬁrms expe-
rience negative abnormal event returns of about -1.6% followed by a partial
rebound. Motivated by Figure 6, I measure abnormal event returns over the
three-day period from close on day T − 2 to close on day T + 1, i.e.
ER = RSEOT−2,T−1 −RMktT−2,T−1
where RSEO and RMkt denote the return of the SEO ﬁrm and the CRSP
value-weighted market return, respectively. Of the 11,481 SEO events, ER is
positive in 4,237 cases (37%). As a simple test of whether the news conveyed
at issue time is associated with future abnormal returns, I decompose ER
into its positive component ER+ = max(ER, 0) and its negative component
ER− = max(−ER, 0) and regress one-year buy and hold abnormal return
6If the issue date is a Saturday or a Sunday, T is the Friday before the issue.
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BHAR on ER+ and ER−. As the relation between ER and BHAR may
not be piecewise linear, I also sort SEOs into quintiles based on ER and
regress BHAR on dummy variables associated with quintiles 1, 2, 3 and 5.
I chose quintile 4 as the base category, as this quintile contains SEOs with
zero abnormal event return.
BHAR is the return of the SEO ﬁrm over some period less the return
of a benchmark investment over the same period. The literature on long
run abnormal returns has documented that results are very sensitive to the
actual calculation of BHAR, i.e. the choice of benchmark (Mitchell and
Staﬀord (2000), Eckbo et al. (2007), and Bessembinder and Zhang (2013)).
One stream of the literature uses the matched ﬁrm approach, in which
the benchmark of a SEO ﬁrm is another ﬁrm, which is similar to the issuer
usually in terms of market value and book-to-market ratio, but Bessembinder
and Zhang (2013) show that issuers and non-issuers diﬀer in several other
characteristics known to predict return. According to the authors, these
diﬀerent characteristics explain the observed diﬀerences in post-issue return
and controlling for these diﬀerences there is no abnormal BHAR. In the
absence of a commonly agreed benchmark for calculation on BHAR, I chose
the simplest possible approach to calculating one-year BHAR as
BHAR = RSEOT+10,T+1y −RMktT+10,T+1y
As this is likely to be a biased estimate of true one-year abnormal return,
it is not suitable for inference on the absolute level of BHAR. However, it
may be more suited for making an inference about the relation between event
abnormal returns and long-run abnormal returns. Table 7 shows the result
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of value-weighted regressions of BHAR on ER+ and ER− as well as on ER
quintile dummies.
A 1% increase in ER−, i.e. a 1% decrease in abnormal return event,
when abnormal event return is already negative, is associated with a 76 bps
decrease in one-year BHAR (t-value -5.78), while ER+ is insigniﬁcant. In
the regression with ER+ and ER− as regressors, the intercept is 1.55%,
indicating that zero or positive event return is associated with small posi-
tive BHAR. In the regression with ER quintile dummies, issuers with lowest
abnormal event returns have a 7.3% lower one-year BHAR (t-value -5.26).
Second and third quintiles also have signiﬁcantly lower BHARs of 5.33%
and 1.87% than the base category. Firms with the highest abnormal event
returns have positive BHARs of 2.8%. This is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero but not from the 1.55% intercept reported in the model with ER+ and
ER− as regressors. Both regressions support that negative event return is
signiﬁcantly associated with BHAR, while positive event returns are not.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
One may be concerned that the results presented above reﬂect that ab-
normal event returns are correlated with other ﬁrm characteristics known to
predict returns. It may, for example, be that the least proﬁtable SEO ﬁrms
experience the lowest event returns. To address this concern, as well as the
methodological issues concerned with BHAR calculations and their distribu-
tion, I construct two calendar-time portfolios as suggested by Mitchell and
Staﬀord (2000).
One portfolio consists of ﬁrms which have carried out an SEO with pos-
itive event returns ER during the past year. The other portfolio consists of
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negative event return SEO ﬁrms. In addition, I construct a long-short zero-
investment portfolio which is long SEO ﬁrms with positive ER and short
SEO ﬁrms with negative ER. The SEO calendar-time portfolios are updated
monthly and SEO ﬁrms are included from the ﬁrst complete month after
T + 10 (10 trading days after the issue) and for a total of 12, 24 or 36 con-
secutive months. I also construct portfolios of ﬁrms which issued 12 to 23
months ago and 24 to 35 months ago, respectively. Value-weighted monthly
portfolio returns are regressed on FF3 as well as on FF5+UDM. Table 8
shows the results of these regressions.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
In panels A and B returns are regressed on FF3. The negative ER port-
folios have signiﬁcant αs between -49 bps and -56 bps for holdings periods of
one, two and three periods. The positive ER portfolios also have negative α's
but the long-short portfolios have signiﬁcant positive α's for holding periods
of one and two years. However, α is only signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst year and
insigniﬁcant for the second and third year.
In panels C and D returns are regressed on FF5+UMD. Controlling for
RMW, CMA and MOM increases α for all SEO portfolios, reﬂecting that
all portfolios have signiﬁcant negative exposure to RMW and CMA. Again,
this conﬁrms the ﬁnding that the underperformance of issuers is partly ex-
plained by their low proﬁtability and high asset growth. When regressed on
FF5+UMD issuers with positive ER have insigniﬁcant αs for all holding peri-
ods considered. However, negative ER issuers experience signiﬁcant negative
abnormal returns for two-year holding periods as well as during the second
year. The long-short portfolios also have positive, but insigniﬁcant, abnormal
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returns for all holding periods. Even though t-statistics are less impressive
than for the BHAR regressions, these results conﬁrm that underperformance
subsequent to SEOs is stronger when the SEO conveyed bad news than
when it conveyed good news.
7 Conclusions
Firms which issue new equity subsequently have low returns. Some of this
performance can be explained by exposure to other risk factors beyond the
classical three Fama French factors, but some abnormal return remains to be
explained.
I propose a model in which some investors are uninformed, assuming
that the latest observed price reﬂects fundamental value, whereas informed
investors receive a noisy value signal. Prices are set in competition between
uninformed and informed investors and I show that prices converge to an
equilibrium price dependent only on the value signal observed by informed
investors. The speed of price discovery depends on the noise embedded in
the signals received by informed investors, i.e. how easy the ﬁrm is to value,
and will, in the presence of shorting constraints or limitations, be slowest for
bad news. I have applied this model to the case of issuance and derive two
predictions.
First, the model predicts that underperformance subsequent to stock is-
sues will be strongest for the ﬁrms which are hardest to value. As proxies
for hard to value, I use measures of information available, analyst disagree-
ment, and more distant cash-ﬂows. Empirically, I show that ﬁrms with these
characteristics do indeed underperform subsequent to issues, whereas ﬁrms
38
without these characteristics do not underperform.
Second, the model predicts that underperformance will be strongest when
stock issues convey negative news. I use SEO event returns as proxy for the
news conveyed at issue, and empirically show that the negative component
of abnormal event returns is signiﬁcantly associated with negative buy and
hold abnormal returns, whereas the positive component of abnormal event
returns does not predict buy and hold abnormal returns. Moreover, I show
that a calendar-time portfolio of SEO ﬁrms with negative abnormal event
returns have signiﬁcant negative abnormal return over some holding periods,
whereas a calendar-time portfolio of SEO ﬁrms with positive abnormal event
returns have insigniﬁcant or numerically lower abnormal return subsequent
to the SEO.
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Figure 1: Analyst coverage in IBES. The ﬁgure shows the number of ﬁrms
with at least one analyst estimate of next quarter earnings per share (eps),
price target (ptg) and recommendation (rec).
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Figure 2: Number of ﬁrms per NetIssue group. Repurchasers have NetIssue
below -0.1%, zero-issuers have NetIssue between -0.1% and 0.1%. Small
issues, mid issues and large issues, are net issuers, with NetIssue of at least
0.1%, 3%, and 15%, respectively. During most of the period small issuer are
the largest group. The number of zero-issuer has gradually declined over
the period, while the number of repurchasers has been highly volatile.
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Figure 3: Coeﬃcient estimates in percentage of dummy variables associated
with issue1, issue3, issue4 and issue5 in Fama-MacBeth regressions. The
value shows the monthly excess return, relative to the base category issue2
(zero-issuers). Control variables are log market value mv and log book-
to-market ratio bm (red bars) and mv, bm, past year return MOM, return
on equity ROE, and past year asset growth AG (blue bars). Regardless of
controls, repurchasers and small issuers have insigniﬁcantly higher returns
than zero issuer. Mid issuers have insigniﬁcantly lower returns while the
largest issuers have signiﬁcantly lower returns of about 30 bps monthly (t-
value -2.2 in both speciﬁcations).
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Panel A: α of portfolios sorted on NetIssue regressed on the CRSP
value-weighted market return.
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Panel B: α of portfolios sorted on NetIssue regressed on the market return,
SMB, and HML returns (FF3).
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Panel C: α of portfolios sorted on NetIssue regressed on the market return,
SMB, and HML, RMW, CMA and UMD returns (FF5+UMD).
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Figure 4: Monthly α in per cent of value-weighted portfolios based on sorts
on NetIssue. Portfolios are formed monthly and portfolio excess returns
are regressed on the market return (panel A), FF3 returns (panel B), and
FF5+UMD returns (panel C.). Repurchasers have NetIssue below -0.1%,
zero-issuers have NetIssue between -0.1% and 0.1%. Small issues, mid issues
and large issues, are net issuers with NetIssue of at least 0.1%, 3%, and 15%,
respectively. α decreases uniformly in issue group when controlling for market
(panel A) and FF3 factors (panel B). When controlling for FF5+UMD, α is
highest for small issuers and lowest for large issuers.
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Figure 5: Monthly α of value-weighted portfolios sorted independently on
NetIssue and MV regressed on the FF5+UMD factors. Repurchasers have
NetIssue below -0.1%, zero-issuers have NetIssue between -0.1% and 0.1%.
Small issues, mid issues and large issues, are net issuers with NetIssue of at
least 0.1%, 3%, and 15%, respectively. The sort on MV is based on quintiles
for NYSE ﬁrms. Small cap repurchasers have an α of 36 bps, while small cap
ﬁrms with the largest issuance activity have an α of -22 bps. The diﬀerence
between these is the issuance spread ∆MV1 = 58 bps. For large cap ∆
MV
5 is
-14 bps.
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Figure 6: Value-weighted average cumulative abnormal return of SEO ﬁrms
before and after the issue date (T ). Abnormal returns are calculated as SEO
ﬁrm return less market return. On average issues occur on the backdrop of
almost 1% abnormal return between T − 10 and T − 2. During the event
window from close on T −2 to close on T +1, issuers have negative abnormal
returns of -1.6%. Subsequently, there is a partial recovery.
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Table 6: Value-weighted returns on double sorted portfolios are regressed on
FF3 and FF5+UMD factors. First sort variable is NetIssue while the second
sort variable is one of the nine proxies for hard to value. Figures reported
are the monthly issuance spreads in per cent for the most easy to value and
the most hard to value quintiles of the second sort variable, i.e. ∆k1 and ∆
k
5,
where k is the second sort variable. An example may be 1.10 (ﬁrst row to the
right) ∆MV1 = α
MV
1,1 − αMV5,1 , i.e. the diﬀerence in abnormal return between
a portfolio of small cap repurchasers (issue1) and a portfolio of small cap
issuers (issue5) when return is regressed on FF3 factors. When regressed
on FF5+UMD this issuance spread is 58 bps, as illustrated in Figure 5. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis and *, ** and *** indicates signiﬁcance
in a two-sided test at a 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Easy to value Hard to value
Second sort variable FF5+UMD FF3 FF5+UMD FF3
MV -0.14 0.14 0.58*** 1.10***
(-0.59) (0.62) (3.13) (5.51)
Yield -0.15 -0.07 0.8*** 1.01***
(-0.61) (-0.31) (3.49) (4.53)
AG 0.17 0.47* 0.34 0.62**
(0.6) (1.68) (1.27) (2.4)
ROE -0.01 0.1 0.11 0.57**
(-0.03) (0.39) (0.4) (2.08)
EP 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.72***
(1.24) (1.44) (1.51) (2.72)
Deps -0.37 -0.04 0.54 0.98***
(-1.26) (-0.14) (1.5) (2.79)
#Analysts -0.02 0.21 0.4 0.81***
(-0.08) (0.85) (1.42) (2.88)
Drec 0.22 0.52 1.07*** 1.24***
(0.61) (1.48) (2.67) (3.19)
Dptg -0.07 0.07 1.38** 1.69***
(-0.22) (0.23) (2.57) (3.28)
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Table 7: Value-weighted regressions of SEO one-year buy and hold abnormal
returns (BHAR) regressed on event return (ER), decomposed into its positive
and negative component, i.e. ER+ = max(ER, 0) and ER− = max(−ER, 0)
and on event return dummies ER1, ER2, ER3 and ER5, corresponding to
ﬁrst, second, third and ﬁfth quintile of event returns. Fourth quintile is
chosen as base category because it contains issuers with zero. t-statistics are
reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates signiﬁcance in a two-sided
test at a 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively. ER
Intecept 1.55**
(2.18)
ER+ -0.02
-0.15
ER− -0.76**
(-5.78)
ER1 -7.3***
(-5.26)
ER2 -5.33***
(-4.83)
ER3 -1.87**
(-1.98)
ER5 2.8***
(2.13)
Adj. R2 0.33% 0.53%
N 10351 10351
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Appendix A
Proposition 1.
If µi,t = µi for all t ≥ T then Pt → P ∗ for t→∞
The rate of convergence is Σ(1−τ)
Σ(1−τ)+τ .
Proof
Let P ∗ = µi−Σaσ2u deﬁne the equilibrium price. By (2) the market clearing
price is Pt = µt+
stτ−Σaσ2u
Σ(1−τ)+τ ,∀t ≥ T . Since st+1 = µi,t+1−µu,t+1 = µi−Pt−aσ2u
and µu,t+1 = Pt + aσ
2
u insertion in (2) yields
Pt+1 = µt+1 +
st+1τ − Σaσ2u
Σ(1− τ) + τ = Pt + aσ
2
u +
(µi − Pt − aσ2u)τ − Σaσ2u
Σ(1− τ) + τ
with the deﬁnition Λ = Σ(1− τ) + τ
Pt − P ∗ = µt + stτ − Σaσ
2
u
Λ
− (µi − Σaσ2u)
= (µt − µi) + st
( τ
Λ
)
+ Σaσ2u
(
1− 1
Λ
)
= st
( τ
Λ
− 1
)
+ Σaσ2u
(
1− 1
Λ
)
and
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Pt+1 − P ∗ = Pt + aσ2u +
(µi − Pt − aσ2u)τ − Σaσ2u
Λ
− (µi − Σaσ2u)
= Pt
(
1− τ
Λ
)
+ aσ2u
(
1 + Σ− Σ + τ
Λ
)
+ µi
( τ
Λ
− 1
)
=
(
µt +
stτ − Σaσ2u
Λ
)(
1− τ
Λ
)
+ aσ2u
(
Σ− Στ
Λ
)
− µi
(
1− τ
Λ
)
=
(
−st + stτ − Σaσ
2
u
Λ
)(
1− τ
Λ
)
+ Σaσ2u
(
1− τ
Λ
)
=
(
1− τ
Λ
)(
st
( τ
Λ
− 1
)
+ Σaσ2u
(
1− 1
Λ
))
The rate of convergence is deﬁned as
γt =
|Pt+1 − P ∗|
|Pt − P ∗| = 1−
τ
Λ
=
Σ(1− τ)
Σ(1− τ) + τ
Since γt is constant for t ≥ T , Pt converges linearly to P ∗ provided that
|γt| < 1 which is the case for all τ ∈]0, 1[.
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The Issuance Eﬀect in International Markets
Niklas Kohl
*
Abstract
Equity issuance predicts future low returns, but the reasons for
this underperformance are disputed. I use an international sample and
show that the underperformance by issuers is smaller in developed mar-
kets than in other markets. This empirical result is consistent with the
hard to value theory which holds that underperformance is strongest
for ﬁrms which are hard to value because informed investors are
more constrained in their ability to express negative information (Kohl,
2016). However, the result contradicts the ﬁndings of McLean et al.
(2009), who argue that the underperformance of issuers is strongest
in developed markets because lower issue costs induce issuers to ex-
ploit mispricings more frequently. To analyze this, I have developed a
model with issue costs and information asymmetry between issuer and
investors, where opportunistic issuers, to some extent, manage to sell
overpriced equity. The model predicts that issuer underperformance
is increasing in issue cost in line with the ﬁndings in this paper.
∗Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Fred-
eriksberg, Denmark. E-mail: nk.ﬁ@cbs.dk. I am grateful for comments and suggestions
received from Søren Hvidkjær, Nigel Barradale, and Ken Bechmann as well as seminar
participants at Copenhagen Business School. Any errors remain mine.
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1 Introduction
Firms which issue new equity underperform subsequently, relative to other
ﬁrms. This phenomenon was ﬁrst studied in the context of seasoned equity
oﬀerings (Loughran and Ritter (1995)). Later research has generalized this
result to issuance in general and shown that ﬁrms which issue equity, on
average, subsequently underperform (Daniel and Titman (2006), Pontiﬀ and
Woodgate (2008), Fama and French (2008b), Fama and French (2008a)).
McLean et al. (2009) show that this result also applies in international mar-
kets.
While the issuance eﬀect, i.e. the underperformance by issuers, is well
documented, the reasons for underperformance are disputed. The classi-
cal behavioral explanation suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1995) is that
ﬁrms announce issues when their equity is grossly overvalued and the mar-
ket does not revalue the stock appropriately, and the stock is still substan-
tially overvalued when the issue occurs. Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), more
cautiously, conclude that ... it appears doubtful that these results can be
explained solely by a risk-based asset pricing model but do not suggest any
particular behavioral explanation and do not rule out that the underperfor-
mance could be explained by a transaction cost model.1
A risk-based explanation is given by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013)
who ﬁnd that SEO underperformance is explained by risk factors including
idiosyncratic volatility, liquidity, momentum and investment. When control-
ling for these factors, the issuance eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant. A related
1Unfortunately, Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008) do not specify what transaction cost
model they have in mind. In this paper, I show that issue transaction costs increase
subsequent underperformance, but only in the presence of a deviation from rational ex-
pectations on the side of investors.
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result is Lyandres et al. (2008) who report that about 75% of SEO underper-
formance is explained by an investment factor. Fu and Huang (2015) report
negative, but insigniﬁcant, abnormal returns following SEOs during the pe-
riod of 2003-2013. The authors suggest that this is because the pricing of
stocks has become more eﬃcient and ﬁrms less opportunistic in their issuance
behavior.
McLean, Pontiﬀ, and Watanabe (2009), in the following MPW, study
the issuance eﬀect in the cross-section of countries. According to MPW, the
issuance eﬀect is strongest in countries with greater issuance activity, greater
stock market development, and stronger investor protection. The authors
propose that this is because stock issuance and repurchases are cheaper in
these more developed markets. This enables ﬁrms to be more opportunistic
in their issuance activity, whereas In less developed markets where share
issuance is more costly, the beneﬁts of market timing are exceeded by issuance
costs, and share issuance occurs only for primary reasons.
Regardless of whether one views the issuance factor as a priced risk or a
mispricing, it may be a surprise that it is stronger in more developed, and
presumably more eﬃcient, markets than in less developed markets. This
surprise is the starting point of the present paper.
The empirical contribution of this paper is to reconﬁrm the existence
of the issuance factor in an international sample and, more importantly, to
show that the issuance factor is stronger in non-developed markets than in
developed markets. In order to do this, I proceed as follows. First, I repro-
duce some of MPW's ﬁndings, which appear to document that the issuance
eﬀect is strongest in developed markets. Second, I discuss and demonstrate
how these results are not robust to changes in methodological choices. With
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other speciﬁcations, results become insigniﬁcant or even change sign. Fi-
nally, I suggest another methodology, which arguably is more appropriate to
analyze the issuance eﬀect in the cross-section of countries. I show that the
issuance eﬀect is indeed stronger in non-developed markets than in developed
markets, as predicted by the model discussed above.
This result is consistent with the hard to value explanation advocated
in my paper, Kohl (2016), which holds that underperformance by issuers
is strongest for ﬁrms that are harder for investors to value. Here I show
that the issuance eﬀect, in the US market, is strongest for small cap ﬁrms,
ﬁrms with high dispersion in analyst estimates and recommendations, and
ﬁrms with more distant cash-ﬂows, such as ﬁrms with low proﬁtability, low
dividend yield, or high asset growth. In the current paper I show that the
issuance factor is also stronger in hard to value non-developed markets than
in developed markets.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to present an alternative or
complementary explanation for the stronger issuance factor in less developed
markets. Inspired by MPW's heuristic analysis of the relationship between
the ease at which equity can be issued and long-run issuer underperformance,
I extend the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of ﬁrms' issuance decision with
issue costs. In addition, I augment the model with a deviation from rational
expectations on the side of investors.2 Not surprisingly, the model shows that
the introduction of issue costs reduces the frequency at which issues occur.
However, when issues occur, higher levels of issue costs increase long-run
issuer underperformance. The model predicts that less developed markets
2Although this is not in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) investor mispricing is
necessary in order to be able to generate non-zero long-run returns in the model.
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with higher issue costs, ﬁnancial or otherwise, will have fever equity issues
(as shown by MPW) and larger underperformance subsequent to issue. These
predictions are in line with the empirical results obtained.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 an
extension of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of ﬁrms' issuance decision is
presented and analyzed. Section 3 describes and deﬁnes data and variables
used in the empirical study. The empirical results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of the Issuance Decision
In this Section I augment the Myers and Majluf (1984), henceforth MM,
model with issue costs and investor overvaluation. Issue costs should be
thought of as a proxy for market development and measure all costs, ﬁnancial
or otherwise, associated with raising new equity. The underlying assumption
is that issue costs, on average, will be lower in more developed markets than
in less developed markets. Investor overvaluation is a necessary addition
to the model to generate long-run underperformance of issuers. I make no
assumptions on diﬀerences in the level of overvaluation between markets.
MM consider a ﬁrm with assets in place with value a ≥ 0 and an invest-
ment opportunity with net present value of b ≥ 0, which cannot be post-
poned and which must be ﬁnanced with new equity E > 0, raised from new
investors.3 Without loss of generality, I assume that the ﬁrm has one share
outstanding and can issue new shares in any fraction. Firm management acts
3In MM, ﬁrms may have ﬁnancial slack S. E is the equity to be raised in excess of S to
undertake the investment. Since ﬁnancial slack plays no role in my model, I have omitted
this detail.
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in the interests of old investors. Before event time, ﬁrm management knows
the realizations of a and b, while investors only know the distribution of these.
The ﬁrm's decision on whether or not to issue, and consequently forfeit the
investment opportunity, depends on the price p at which new equity can be
issued.
If the ﬁrm does not issue, the per share fundamental value is a. If the
ﬁrm does issue and invest, the number of shares increases with a factor p+E
p
and fundamental value per share will be p(a+b+E)
p+E
. The ﬁrm will issue if
and only if it increases per share fundamental value, i.e. the ﬁrm issues if
and only if b > E
p
a − E. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The ﬁrm
will issue if (a, b) ∈ M ′, the region to the left and not issue if (a, b) ∈ M .
In MM, investors have rational expectations. Hence, the equilibrium price
must satisfy p∗ = E(a+ b | (a, b) ∈M ′).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The model predicts that event returns will be negative, except for de-
generate cases where issue always or never occurs, because the decision to
issue reveals negative information about the distribution of a + b, but, on
average, investors get a fair deal and purchase new equity at its expected
fundamental value.4 Consequently, long-run returns will be zero. I introduce
two innovations to the MM model.
First, to model costs in connection with the issue, monetary or otherwise,
4To see that event returns are negative, consider that the pre-event equilibrium price p0
is the issue probability weighted average of the price p∗ if an issue has been announced and
the price p− once it is known that an issue will not be announced. As shown in Figure 1,
no issue implies that the expected value of a exceeds issue price, i.e. p− > p∗ ⇒ p∗ < p0
which shows that event return will be strictly negative, except for degenerate cases, with
issue probability 0 or 1, where event return will be zero.
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I introduce an issue cost of c. In order to raise new equity E issue proceeds
must be E + c. E and c are known by the ﬁrm as well as investors. c aﬀects
the ﬁrm's issuance decision as ﬁrms will only issue when b > E+c
p
a − E,
i.e. for ﬁxed a, b must be ca
p
higher than without issue costs for an issue to
occur. Issue costs will also aﬀect the equilibrium price as investors will take
c into consideration. Every thing else being equal, issue costs will reduce the
equilibrium price which in turn will further reduce the issue probability.
Second, to enable the model to generate long-run negative returns, a
deviation from rational expectations is necessary. One way to achieve this
is to introduce a systematic bias in investors' valuation of assets in place
and the investment opportunity. In particular, I introduce the overvaluation
parameter µ ≥ 1. While the true density function of x = a + b is f(x)
investors believe the density function is fµ(x) where fµ(µx) = 1
µ
f(x), i.e.
investors systematically overvalue a+ b by a factor µ. I denote the investors'
expected value Eµ, where the true expectation is E, i.e. Eµ(x) = (1+µ)E(x).
µ is known by the ﬁrm and aside from the systematic overvaluation, investors
are rational. With overvaluation and issue costs, the equilibrium price is
p∗ = Eµ(ab) | (a, b) ∈M ′)− c = µE((a+ b) | (a, b) ∈M ′)− c
The MM model corresponds to the special case where c = 0 and µ = 1.
Overvaluation changes the right-hand side of the equilibrium equation. This
will increase equilibrium price and incite ﬁrms to issue more frequently.
In general, closed form expressions for equilibrium price p∗ cannot be de-
rived but for any particular density function f , the equilibrium price can be
found iteratively, as described in MM. The idea is to guess an issue price, use
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this to calculate the ﬁrm's issuance policy (the deﬁnition of region M') and
use this to calculate, possibly through simulation, the investors' expected
valuation conditioned on issue. In the next iteration, this valuation is used
as issue price guess. This procedure will converge to an equilibrium price.
For some density functions, simulation can be omitted because investor val-
uations can be expressed in closed form, i.e. a closed form solution exists for∫
M ′(a+ b) f(a+ b) da db. As an example, I have chosen to consider the case
where a and b are independent and uniformly distributed on [amin, amax] and
[0, bmax] respectively.
Figure 2 panel A considers the case with issue costs but without over-
valuation, where the value of assets in place a is between 20 and 40, the
value of the investment opportunity b between 0 and 10 and a new issue, if
any, must raise E = 20 plus issue costs c. The Figure shows issue price p∗,
issue probability, and - conditional on issue - event return, expected long-run
return, expected value of a and expected value of b as function of issue costs
c.5 In panel B µ = 1.1, i.e. investors overvalue assets in place and the value
of the investment opportunity by 10% and otherwise the same parameters as
in panel A.
As expected, issue price and issue probability decreases with increasing
issue costs and are at higher levels when investors overvalue the ﬁrm. Event
return also decreases in issue costs because an issue is almost certain when
c is low, while an issue is more of a surprise at higher levels of c. Long-
run returns are zero without overvaluation. With overvaluation (panel B)
and no issue costs, long-run returns are around 9%. As issue costs increase
5The price before event time is
∫
M ′(µ(a+ b)− c) f(a+ b) da db+
∫
M
(µa) f(a+ b) da db.
Event return is the relative price change once an issue is announced. Long-run return is
relative price change once the realizations of a and b are revealed.
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from 0 to 5 long-run underperformance increases to around 11%. This is
no coincidence. For any realization of (a, b) ∈M ′ investors expect per share
fundamental value to be µ(a+b)−c while true value is a+b−c. Consequently,
long-run return is
(a+ b− c)− (µ(a+ b)− c)
µ(a+ b)− c =
(1− µ)(a+ b)
µ(a+ b)− c
which is decreasing in c for all µ > 1. Qualitatively similar results are
obtained with other a and b intervals, and other values of E and µ.6
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The model shows that the introduction of issue costs will decrease issue
probability. When issues occur, the value of the investment opportunity b
will, on average, be higher. At a ﬁrst glance, this may suggest that issues
more frequently occur for primary reasons, as suggested by MPW. However,
the average value of assets in place a is decreasing in issue costs. In fact,
the combined eﬀect is that a+ b is decreasing in issue costs. This results in
more negative event returns when issues are announced and in more negative
long-run returns in the presence of investor overvaluation at event time.
3 Data and Variables
This study covers US as well as international markets. For US ﬁrms, stock
return data and other stock data were obtained from the monthly CRSP ﬁles
6For some parameter conﬁgurations event returns are positive and increasing in issue
costs with as well as without investor overvaluation. This happens when E is very small
relative to c. In these cases, the choice to issue may primarily signal good news about b.
Long-run returns remain decreasing in issue costs with investor overvaluation.
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and accounting data were obtained from Compustat. For international ﬁrms,
these data were obtained from Thomson Datastream. The international sam-
ple consists of all ﬁrms followed by Worldscope.7 To determine the country
of ﬁrms in the Datastream sample the variable ISIN_ISSUER_CTRY is used.
Firms for which this variable is not available and ﬁrms for which it is US are
discarded from the Datastream part of the sample. All calculations are in
USD.
Some ﬁrms have issued more than one class of ordinary equity. For these
ﬁrms only the share class with highest aggregate market value is used, but
the market value of the ﬁrm is calculated as the sum of market values for all
issued classes of ordinary shares.
Following Daniel and Titman (2006), Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), and
McLean et al. (2009), I calculate net issue over the past year as
NetIssuet,t−12 = ln(AdjustedSharest)− ln(AdjustedSharest−12)
where AdjustedShares t is the time t adjusted number of shares. For US
data, the adjusted number of shares is calculated using the the CRSP vari-
ables shrout and cfacshr whereas the adjusted number of shares in the
international sample is calculated from the Datastream variables nosh and
af. In both cases, the number of shares is adjusted for stock splits, stock
dividends as well as other corporate actions such as rights issues. Net issue
over the past two and three years, denoted NetIssue t,t−24 and NetIssue t,t−36,
respectively, is similarly calculated.
McKeon (2015) shows that the majority of issues are small investor-
7Worldscope is an international database of accounting and other fundamental data
provided by Thomson Reuters.
80
initiated issues, for example in connection with the exercise of employee
stock options. These issues are less likely to convey any information about
the future stock return than ﬁrm-initiated issues. He suggests distinguishing
between investor- and ﬁrm-initiated issues using a 3% threshold. Previous
research shows that this is indeed important. Fama and French (2008a)
document that ﬁrms conducting small issues have slightly higher returns
than zero-issuers while ﬁrms with large issuance activity underperform sig-
niﬁcantly. Consequently, I deﬁne the indicator variables issueri as 1 if net
issue exceeds 0.03 over the past i years, and 0 otherwise.
In addition to NetIssue, a number of variables are known to predict fu-
ture return. MOM is the return over the past year excluding the past month.
cap is the logarithm of ﬁrm market value.8 bm is the logarithm of the ratio
between book equity and market value. In some cases, I include observa-
tions for which bm cannot be calculated. To facilitate this, I follow MPW
and deﬁne bm = 0 and bmdummy = 1 when bm cannot be calculated while
bmdummy = 0 for ﬁrms with known bm value. Asset growth AG is calculated
as the relative change in book value of assets over the past year and return
on equity ROE is calculated as the net income relative to book equity for US
data. For international data, the Worldscope ROE variable wc08301 is used.
All accounting variables are lagged by at least six months and only annual
accounting values are used.9
Throughout this paper, it is required that cap, MOM, NetIssue and next
month return can be calculated. (ﬁrm, month) observations for which this
is not possible are discarded from the sample. In some cases, observations
8In general, lower case variables are the logarithm of the original variable.
9Since wc08301 reports current ﬁscal year ROE it is lagged by 18 months.
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without bm, AG and ROE are also discarded.
Figure 3 shows the number of ﬁrms in the full sample per month while
Figure 4 shows the distribution between the largest countries. In the 80s
US ﬁrms accounted for around three quarters of the all ﬁrms and six devel-
oped markets (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, and Canada) accounted
for 95% of all ﬁrms. By 2014 the US accounted for less than 15% of all ﬁrms
while the six mentioned countries accounted for a total of about 40%. This
development primarily reﬂects the growing coverage of the Datastream and
Worldscope databases and shows that the early part of the sample is heavily
biased toward a small number of markets.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
MPW study the relationship between the issuance factor and a number
of country-speciﬁc variables proxying for market development and investor
protection, including the frequency of stock issues, stock market liquidity,
GDP per capita, and a number of proxies for investor protection and earnings
management. I use some of these variables as reported by MPW. Moreover,
I distinguish between developed markets, which are the markets identiﬁed as
MSCI as developed and non-developed markets, which are all other markets.10
10MSCI deﬁne the following markets as developed; Canada, United States, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan,
New Zealand, and Singapore. The majority of the other, i.e. non-developed, markets
considered in this study are classiﬁed as emerging by MSCI.
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4 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, I reproduce some of
MPW's results on the issuance eﬀect in the cross-section of markets. The
purpose is to demonstrate that, through the use of my dataset, I can largely
reproduce their results. Second, I show how the signiﬁcance and even sign
of the results presented by MPW are sensitive to particular methodological
choices. Finally, I propose a diﬀerent methodology, which arguably is more
suited to analyze the issuance eﬀect in the cross-section of countries. Using
this methodology, I show that the issuance eﬀect is stronger in non-developed
countries than in developed countries.
4.1 Reproduction of Selected Results from MPW
According to MPW, the issuance eﬀect is stronger in developed markets than
in other markets. To show this, they use proxies for market development and
corporate governance. They report Fama-MacBeth regressions with next
month and next year return as dependent variables and factors known to
predict return, cap, bm, bmdummy and MOM, as well as NetIssue, a proxy
for market development or corporate governance and an interaction term
(NetIssue times the proxy for market development or corporate governance).
The regressor of primary interest is the interaction term. MPW show
that it estimates the marginal impact of the proxy in the issuance eﬀect.
If, for example, a proxy for market liquidity times NetIssue is negative and
signiﬁcant, the inference is that an increase in the proxy for market liquidity
is associated with a signiﬁcantly stronger (more negative) issuance eﬀect.
In MPW, the interaction term is generally signiﬁcant; for example, market
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liquidity times NetIssue is signiﬁcantly negative. The inference is that the
issuance eﬀect is more negative (stronger) in countries with higher market
liquidity.
In the reproduction, I follow MPW and winzorize regressors within coun-
try at the 1st and 99th percentiles. These percentiles are calculated for each
time period.11 For international data, but not US data, observations with
return below the 1st or above the 99th percentile are trimmed, i.e. removed
from the sample. McLean et al. (2009) motivate this with ... many of these
extreme observations appear to be the result of coding errors.
The time period is June 1981 to July 2006. As MPW, for each (country,
date) combination, I require at least 50 observations. Otherwise, the obser-
vations associated with the (country, date) combination are discarded. This
concentrates the sample even further than suggested by Figure 4. In fact, the
early sample, in my reproduction, consists of only eight developed countries
and, by 1990, these eight countries still correspond to more than 96% of the
sample. MPW report a broader initial sample including ﬁve more countries
of which two (Philippines and South Africa) are not developed markets. One
reason for this diﬀerence may be that I have limited the sample to ﬁrms
covered by Worldscope.
MPW propose a number of variables, broadly categorized under the head-
ings issuance activity, market development and governance, which may be
related to the magnitude of the issuance eﬀect. I reproduce their results using
most of these with values as reported in MPW.12 Percentage with non-zero
issuance is the fraction of (ﬁrm, month) observations with non-zero NetIs-
11McLean et al. (2009) do not specify whether they calculate the 1st and 99th percentiles
for each time period or for all observations for each country.
12McLean et al. (2009), Table 7.
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sue and is considered a proxy for the cost of share issuance. A number of
marked development variables were originally introduced by La Porta et al.
(2006). Liquidity is the value of stocks traded scaled by GDP for the period
of 1996-2000 while Turnover is the value of stocks traded scaled by the total
market value. GDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita.
Governance variables used have their origin in La Porta et al. (1998).
Common law is an indicator variable with the value 1 for common law coun-
tries and 0 otherwise, measuring the degree of investor protection. accounting
is an index of accounting standards, where a higher value implies higher stan-
dards, liability and criminal measure how easily accountants, directors and
distributors can be pursued in civil and criminal courts, respectively. Higher
values indicate that this is easier. Investor protection is compiled from several
measures with higher values indicating higher levels of investor protection.
Higher values of earnings management indicate less reliable accounts.
MPW show that these measures, except for earnings management, are
almost uniformly positively correlated, while earnings management is neg-
atively correlated to the other measures. Countries with more developed
markets (more issuance activity, higher liquidity, higher turnover, and higher
per capital GDP) have higher legal standards, higher levels of investor pro-
tection and less earnings management.
Table 1 reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions with next month
return as dependent variable and the same regressors as in MPW. Consistent
with MPW I ﬁnd cap, bm and MOM to be signiﬁcant in all regressions. The
regressor of primary interest is the interaction between NetIssue and variables
proxying for market development and corporate governance.
Figure 5 compares the t-value of the interaction variable reported by
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MPW with my ﬁndings. As MPW, I ﬁnd the interaction between NetIs-
sue and market development variables - fraction of non-zero issuers, market
liquity, market turnover and gdp - to be negative. Though my t-statistics
are lower, the interaction is also signiﬁcant in my sample except for non-zero
issuance. This suggests that higher level of market development is associated
with a stronger (more negative) issuance eﬀect.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
In contrast to MPW, I do not ﬁnd common law and accounting standards
to be signiﬁcant. For the legal variables Criminal and Liability as well as for
investor protection and earnings management my results have same sign as
those of MPW but only Criminal and investor protection are signiﬁcant.13
Taken in their entirety, the results are qualitatively aligned with the results
of MPW.
4.2 Sensitivity of the MPW results
The second part of my empirical results examine the impact of a number
of the methodological choices in MPW. The purpose is to demonstrate that
results, and consequently inference, is sensitive to these choices. Alternative
choices, which may be as justiﬁable as those made by MPW, destroy the
signiﬁcance, and in some cases even reverses the sign of results.
13The interaction between NetIssue and Criminal is positive and signiﬁcant in MPW
as well as my ﬁndings. This implies, that the issuance eﬀect is weaker (less negative) in
countries where directors etc. can more easily can be pursued in criminal court. This
result is inconsistent with the predictions of MPW.
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I consider the following empirical choices; First, MPW only report equal-
weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions. Since the vast majority of ﬁrms are
small, especially in the MPW sample which includes ﬁrms outside the World-
scope universe, equal-weighted results may reﬂect phenomena which only or
primarily exist for small cap ﬁrms.
Second, the early sample is dominated by US ﬁrms and the representation
of ﬁrms from non-developed economies is particularly low in the early sample.
For this reason, it is natural consider whether the results hold in a later period
with broader international coverage.
Third, the winzorization methodology employed by MPW may be dis-
puted. Though winzorization is justiﬁed to eliminate the impact of outliers
and coding errors, it is not given that winzorization should be performed in-
dependently for each country. A particular concern is that winzorization at
the 1st and 99th percentiles will have no impact on samples (countries) with
at most 100 observations. This also holds for the trimming of the sample at
the 1st and 99th percentile next month return applied to non-US data. Trim-
ming is justiﬁed as Ince and Porter (2006) show that Datastream contains
errors, resulting in implausibly large returns, but trimming independently by
country does not aﬀect small sample countries. Further trimming of the in-
ternational data at the 99th percentile is likely to introduce a downwards bias
on international returns. On average, international observations are trimmed
above a monthly return of about 61%. Though this is a high return, it is far
from implausibly high, thus the vast majority of observations removed are
likely to be genuine observations.
Fourth, MPW only control for cap, bm and MOM. By now, it is well
established that controlling for investment and proﬁtability is appropriate
87
when measuring the issuance eﬀect ((Lyandres et al., 2008), (Bessembinder
and Zhang, 2013)) since a part of the issuance eﬀect is explained by these
factors14.
In tests for robustness with respect to the four issues mentioned above, I
redo the regressions reported in Section 4.1 changing one issue at a time as
well as changing all four. For each regression, three t-statistics are presented:
The t-value report by MPV, the t-value reported in subsection 4.1 and t-value
with modiﬁed methodological choices.
Figure 6 shows results with value-weighted Fama MacBeth regressions as
the only change while Figure 7 shows the period January 1990 to December
2014 as the only change (i.e. equal-weighted regressions). Both these changes
almost uniformly reduce the signiﬁcance of results, though the sign generally
remains unchanged.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Several modiﬁcations of the winzorization and trimming scheme are pos-
sible. In Figure 8, regressors are trimmed at their global 1st and 99th per-
centiles, instead of national calculation of winzorization values. As above,
international return observations are trimmed at their global 1st and 99th
percentiles. This approach, which also ensures winzorization and trimming
for countries with less than 100 observations, reduces the signiﬁcance of re-
sults.
14A ﬁfth debatable choice by MPW is the choice to exclude observations from countries
with less than 50 observations. Since country is not used in the Fama MacBeth regressions,
there is no particular reason to exclude observations from countries with few observations.
However, including these observations only has a minor impact on results.
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Changes in trimming methodology may also increase signiﬁcance. Fig-
ure 9 shows results if all countries, including the US, are treated equally
in the sense that regressors are winzorized at their national 1st and 99th
percentiles while return observations are trimmed at their national 1st and
99st next month return percentiles. This approach, which ensures that ex-
treme returns are also trimmed for US data, increases the signiﬁcance of the
interaction variables, in most cases to the levels reported by MPV.15
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
In Figure 10, the sample is limited to observations for which bm, ROE
and AG are known, and these are used as controls in the Fama MacBeth
regressions (in addition to the regressors used in the previous regressions).
In most cases, this reduces the signiﬁcance of results.
Finally, in Figure 11, results with four simultaneous changes are reported.
Regressions are value-weighted using all controls including bm, ROE and AG.
The period spans January 1990 to December 2014. Regressors are winzorized
at their global 1st and 99th percentiles and international observations are
trimmed at their global 1st and 99th next month return percentiles. With
these choices, the sign of all interaction variables, except one, is reversed
relative to the results reported by MPW and the only signiﬁcant result is that
higher levels of earnings management are associated with a more negative
(stronger) issuance eﬀect.
15Since percentiles are calculated per country no winzorization and trimming takes place
for countries with less than 100 observations, as discussed above.
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[Insert Figure 10 about here]
[Insert Figure 11 about here]
4.3 The Issuance Eﬀect in the Cross-section of Coun-
tries
Aside from the issues raised above, the full sample Fama-MacBeth method-
ology may not be the best suited to explore how the diﬀerences in national
market characteristics interact with the issuance eﬀect. One concern is that
the results are dominated by a relatively small sample of countries consist-
ing of the largest developed countries and China, India, Korea and Taiwan.
Consequently, the results are driven by as few as ten country observations.
With this small sample size, causal inference about the relationship between
country speciﬁc variables and the issuance eﬀect is problematic.
Another concern is to what extent the proxies for market development
and corporate governance are indeed relevant proxies. As an illustration of
the latter topic, Figure 12 shows the turnover measure used by MPW as a
proxy for market development by MPV while Figure 13 shows the investor
protection proxy. One may argue that Taiwan, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain
and Turkey may not be the most developed markets in the world and some
may be surprised to learn that the markets with lowest investor protection
are Germany, Belgium, Mexico, Austria and Italy.
[Insert Figure 12 about here]
[Insert Figure 13 about here]
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A diﬀerent approach is to treat each country as one data point and to
replace the market development and corporate governance proxies with the
somewhat simpler MSCI market classiﬁcation. For each country, I estimate
the issuance eﬀect with country-speciﬁc value-weighted Fama-MacBeth re-
gressions in which I regress next month return on cap, bm, MOM, AG, ROE
as well as an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm's NetIssue
1,12 is at least 0.03. Motivated by McKeon (2015), I chose the value 0.03 to
distinguish between small investor-initiated issues and ﬁrm-initiated issues,
which are more likely to convey information. I include AG and ROE as in-
vestment and proﬁtability, by now, are known to predict return and because
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), Lyandres et al. (2008), and Kohl (2016)
show that these factors partly explain the underperformance of issuers.
The time period is from January 1990 to December 2015. To be included
in the analysis, observations must have values for all regressors. Regressors
are winzorized at their global 1st and 99th percentiles and international ob-
servations are trimmed at their global 1st and 99th next month return. For
each (country, month) combination, I require at least 50 observations, of
which at least 10 must be issuers with NetIssue of at least 0.03. Moreover,
I require countries to have at least 120 monthly estimates to participate in
the sample. In robustness tests, I change some of these requirements.
Figure 14 reports the estimated issuance eﬀect, i.e. the estimate associated
with issue1, for the 34 countries with suﬃcient observations. For developed
countries, past year issuance is associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in next
month return of 18 bps (t-value 3.70) while the reduction for non-developed
countries is 35 bps (t-value 4.66). The diﬀerence between developed and non-
developed countries of 17 bps is signiﬁcant in a two-sided test on a 10% level
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with a t-value of 1.86. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum test has
a z-score of 1.79.
[Insert Figure 14 about here]
Table 2 reports results of robustness tests. With equal-weighted regres-
sions the estimated underperformance of issuers increase to 32 bps for de-
veloped countries and 48 bps for non-developed countries, reﬂecting that the
issuance eﬀect is stronger for small cap than for large cap. The diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant, though not in the non-parametric test where the z-score drops to
1.52. The country sample size can be increased either by including all coun-
tries with at least 60 months observations or by measuring issue over the past
two or three years. Estimates of underperformance range from 9 to 15 bps
for developed market issuers, while issuers in other markets underperform
by 29 to 39 bps. In all cases, the diﬀerence is strongly signiﬁcant. If issue1
measures NetIssue above 0.01 more ﬁrms are considered issuers. As shown by
McKeon (2015) many of these issues are not ﬁrm-initiated, thus decreasing
the informational content of issue1. This is reﬂected in the results, in partic-
ular the diﬀerence between developed and non-developed countries becomes
insigniﬁcant. Conversely, if issue1 is restricted to ﬁrms with NetIssue above
0.05, the diﬀerence between developed and other countries becomes strongly
signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence is also strongly signiﬁcant if issue is measured
over the past three years with a 5% threshold. Finally, if I do not control for
AG and ROE or if issue is measured with the continuous NetIssue variable
instead of an indicator variable, the diﬀerence between developed and other
markets becomes insigniﬁcant.
For all speciﬁcations, issuers underperform signiﬁcantly relative to other
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ﬁrms and underperformance is always stronger in non-developed markets
than in developed markets. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant in the baseline spec-
iﬁcation and signiﬁcance increases if issuance is measured over two or three
years or if the threshold for being issuer is increased to 5%.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the issuance eﬀect in international markets. This is
important because it provides an out of sample test of the issuance eﬀect
documented in the US market but also because the strength of the issuance
eﬀect may vary systematically in the cross-section of countries. In particular,
I explore whether there is a diﬀerence in issuance eﬀect between developed
markets and non-developed markets. The underlying assumption is that
developed markets, on average, are more eﬃcient and with fewer frictions,
and that this may have impact on ﬁrms' issuance decisions as well as on
market prices.
I extend the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of ﬁrms' issuance decisions
with issue costs and investor overvaluation. Theoretically, this shows that,
with higher issue costs, ﬁrms will issue less frequently and only when they
have more valuable investment opportunities relative to markets with lower
issue costs. Perhaps more surprisingly, the model reveals that higher levels
of issue costs, in the presence of investor overvaluation, also reduces issuer
long-run returns, i.e. increases the issuance eﬀect. This predicts that issues
will be most frequent in the most developed markets and that issuer long-run
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underperformance will be strongest in non-developed markets. Empirically, I
show that the issuance eﬀect is indeed signiﬁcantly stronger in non-developed
markets than in developed markets.
These results are at odds with ﬁndings reported by McLean et al. (2009)
who report that the issuance eﬀect is stronger in more developed markets
because lower issue costs will induce ﬁrms to be more opportunistic in their
issuance and repurchase behavior. I show how these ﬁndings are not robust
to methodological changes and propose an alternative test which, arguably,
is more suited to exploring variation in the issuance eﬀect in the cross-section
of countries.
My ﬁndings are consistent with the hard to value theory, developed in
my paper, Kohl (2016), which holds that issuer underperformance is strongest
when informed investors are more constrained in their ability to express neg-
ative information because of uncertainty about fundamental value. In Kohl
(2016), I show that issuer underperformance is strongest for ﬁrms with the
least information available, with cash-ﬂows in the more distant future and
where dispersion in analyst opinions is highest. This paper shows that issuer
underperformance is stronger in hard to value less developed markets than
in more developed, and presumably more eﬃcient, markets.
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Figure 1: The issuance decision when ﬁrm management knows the per share
value of assets in place a and the investment opportunity b and investors
only know the distribution of these (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The solid line
depicts the case without issue costs. The issue price is p and the equity to be
raised to invest is E. The ﬁrm issue if b > E
p
a−E, the upper-left region M'
and do not issue otherwise (region M). If b = 0, the ﬁrm will issue if a < p.
The dashed line depicts the case with issue cost c. Everything else being
equal, the value of the investment opportunity must be higher than in the
case without issue costs before the ﬁrm choses to issue.
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Panel A
Panel B
Figure 2: Equilibrium issue price p∗, probability of issue, event return, av-
erage long-run return, and average a and b if the ﬁrm issues, all as function
of issue costs c (on the x-axis). a is uniformly distributed on [20, 40], b on
[0, 10], and equity to be raise in the issue E = 20. Qualitatively similar results
are obtained with diﬀerent a and b intervals and diﬀerent E values.
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Figure 3: Number of monthly ﬁrm observations in the full dataset.
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Figure 4: The largest countries as fraction of the full sample.
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Figure 5: Comparison of t-statistics of the interaction between NetIssue and
variables proxying for issuance activity, market development and corporate
governance reported by MPW and the results reported in this paper in Ta-
ble 1 (where details of the regressions are reported). Taken in their entirety,
the ﬁndings of MPW are conﬁrmed.
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Figure 6: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported
by MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from
a reproduction with value-weighted observations otherwise identical to the
reproduction of Table 1. Value weighting generally reduces the signiﬁcance,
but not the sign, of results.
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Figure 7: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported
by MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from a
reproduction using only data from the period of 1990-2014 (where interna-
tional coverage is broader) and otherwise identical to the reproduction of
Table 1. Using a broader sample and shorter time period generally reduces
the signiﬁcance, but not the sign, of results.
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Figure 8: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported by
MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from a re-
production where regressors for international observations are winzorized at
their global (instead of national) 1st and 99th percentiles and otherwise iden-
tical to the reproduction of Table 1. This generally reduces the signiﬁcance,
but not the sign, of results.
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Figure 9: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported
by MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from a
reproduction where all regressors, also for US observations, are winzorized
at their national 1st and 99th percentiles and returns are trimmed at their
national 1st and 99th percentiles, and otherwise identical to the reproduction
of Table 1. In most cases this restores signiﬁcance to the level reported by
MPW.
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Figure 10: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported
by MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from a
reproduction limited to observations with known bm, ROE, and AG where
the latter two are included in the set of regressors, and otherwise identical
to the reproduction of Table 1. This generally reduces the signiﬁcance, but
not the sign, of results.
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Figure 11: Comparison of t-statistics for the interaction term, as reported
by MPW, from the reproduction of MPW reported in Table 1 and from a
reproduction with four simultaneous changes. Regressions are value-weighted
as in Figure 6. The time period is 1990-2014 as in Figure 7. Regressors are
winzorized at their global 1st and 99th percentiles as in Figure 8. The sample
is limited to observations with known bm, ROE, and AG where the latter two
are included in the set of regressors as in Figure 10. Except for one case this
reverses the sign of results and except for one case results are insigniﬁcant.
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Figure 12: Turnover per country, as reported by MPW. Turnover is presum-
ably a proxy for market development.
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Figure 13: Investor protection per country, as reported by MPW.
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Figure 14: The issuance eﬀect for diﬀerent countries. The Figure shows
the estimated increase in next month return associated with issue1, i.e. for
ﬁrms with NetIssue 1,12 ≥ 0.03 when controlling for cap, bm, MOM, AG
and ROE. The issuance eﬀect is most negative (strongest) for non-developed
markets but signiﬁcant for non-developed as well as developed markets. The
diﬀerence between non-developed and developed markets is signiﬁcant on a
10% level with a t-value of 1.86 and a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test z-score
of 1.79
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Does Information Asymmetry Explain Issuer
Underperformance?
Niklas Kohl
*
Abstract
Firms which issue new equity have lower returns than other ﬁrms
subsequent to issue. A prominent behavioral explanation holds that
opportunistic ﬁrms exploit information asymmetry at issue time to
sell overvalued equity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). However, this pa-
per shows that the most overvalued issuers, and those which are least
constrained in the sense that they do not need to issue to continue
operations or service current debt, have as high or higher long-run
run returns than other issuers. Instead, I show that event returns,
and in particular negative evnet returns (bad news) at event time
predicts long-run abnormal return. This result is consistent with in-
vestor underreaction to available information, rather than information
asymmetry at event time.
∗Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Fred-
eriksberg, Denmark. E-mail: nk.ﬁ@cbs.dk. I am grateful for comments and suggestions
received from Søren Hvidkjær and Ken Bechmann. Any errors remain mine.
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1 Introduction
Listed ﬁrms which issue new equity subsequently have low returns. This
has been documented in numerous studies, initially by Loughran and Rit-
ter (1995), in the context of seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs), and later in
the broader context of ﬁrms which issue or retire equity, regardless of rea-
son ((Daniel and Titman, 2006), (Pontiﬀ and Woodgate, 2008), (Fama and
French, 2008b), (Fama and French, 2008a), (McLean et al., 2009)).
The reasons for the low returns are, however, disputed. Loughran and
Ritter (1995), suggest that ﬁrms announce issues when their equity is grossly
overvalued and the market does not revalue the stock appropriately, and
the stock is still substantially overvalued when the issue occurs. According
to the authors, their ... evidence is consistent with a market where ﬁrms take
advantage of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity when, on
average, they are substantially overvalued. Several more recent papers, in-
cluding Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), also fail to ﬁnd risk-based explanations
for low returns post-issue.
A competing stream of literature argues that the apparent underperfor-
mance subsequent to issue is due to exposure to known risk factors or at
least known priced factors, which may or may not proxy for risk. Examples
include Eckbo et al. (2000), Lyandres et al. (2008), and Bessembinder and
Zhang (2013).
Billett et al. (2011) ﬁnd that repeating issuers, regardless of the type
of security issued, underperform signiﬁcantly, while rare issuers do not. A
recent paper by Fu and Huang (2015) argues that signiﬁcant issuer underper-
formance has ceased to exists during the period of 2003-2012 because ﬁrms
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become less opportunistic in stock repurchases and oﬀerings due to more
eﬃcient pricing of stocks.
This paper contains two main results. First, I show that a large portion
of issuer long-run performance is explained by exposure to priced factors
beyond the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French (1992), Fama
and French (1993)). However, some signiﬁcant underperformance remains
unexplained.
Second, and more importantly, I investigate whether issuer long-run un-
derperformance, as suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1995), is due to op-
portunistic ﬁrms' exploitation of information asymmetry at event time. If
information asymmetry is high at event time opportunistic ﬁrms may at-
tempt to exploit this and, unless investors have rational expectations, ﬁrms
may be successful at it. Thus, information asymmetry in combination with
opportunistic issues and deviation from rational expectations at event time
may explain long-run underperformance.
As an alternative to this explanation, I consider the possibility that in-
formation asymmetry is low at event time. If information asymmetry is low
at event time, ﬁrms will have less opportunity to be opportunistic in their
issuance behavior. Nonetheless, long-run underperformance is possible due
to investor underreaction at event time. There may be several reasons for
investor underreaction. Barberis and Thaler (2003) survey a number of psy-
chological biases which may aﬀect how investors form their beliefs. In partic-
ular, conservatism, belief perseverance, and anchoring may all explain why
investors do not fully incorporate new information in prices immediately. Al-
ternatively, delayed price reactions (under- as well as overreaction) can occur
in models with gradual diﬀusion of information (Hong and Stein, 1999) and
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models with inattentive investors (Duﬃe, 2010). Empirically delayed price
reaction is found in a number cases, including post earnings announcement
drift (Bernard and Thomas, 1989) and post dividend change announcement
drift (Michaely et al., 1995).
For these two possibilities, information asymmetry and investor underre-
action, I derive testable implications. Empirical results are consistent with
the investor underreaction hypothesis but not the information asymmetry
hypothesis. I ﬁnd no empirical evidence of the exploitation of information
asymmetry because the most overvalued issuers and the least constrained
issuers, which do not need to issue to ﬁnance operations or service current
debt, overperform or have similar performance compared to less overvalued
issuers and more constrained issuers. In contrast, I ﬁnd that the market
does not fully absorb information conveyed at event time, in particular bad
news at event time. This causes long-run return predictability, in particular
when event returns are negative. To the best of my knowledge, this is a new
ﬁnding.1
While early research focused on the performance of seasoned equity of-
fering (SEO) ﬁrms, most recent work on the relation between issuance and
return considers the full cross-section of ﬁrms to capture the impact of equity
issues and repurchases, regardless of reason. This approach has the advan-
tage of a much larger sample than studies focused on SEOs and, according
to Pontiﬀ and Woodgate (2008), ... results are essentially unaﬀected by
data associated with seasoned equity oﬀerings ..., documenting that the low
returns subsequent to SEOs is part of a broader issuance eﬀect.
1Apart from the preliminary version of this result found in the ﬁrst paper of this
dissertation.
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However, McKeon (2015) shows that in around 90% of ﬁrm-quarters
where new equity is issued, the ﬁrm itself did not initiate any stock is-
sues. These are issues due to, for example, utilization of employee options
and other decisions beyond the control of the ﬁrm. McKeon denotes these
investor-initiated issues as opposed to ﬁrm-initiated issues, typically in the
form of SEOs, where the ﬁrm takes initiative to issue new equity. McKeon
(2015) shows that relative issue size, i.e. proceeds of the issue relative to
ﬁrm market value, is an empirically strong indicator of ﬁrm-initiated issues
since quarters with a relative issue of at least 3% nearly always contain a
ﬁrm-initiated issue whereas quarters with a relative issue of less than 2%
almost never include a ﬁrm-initiated component.
Since the objective of this paper is to test whether information asymme-
try explain subsequent issuer performance, I limit the sample to situations
where this may possibly have occurred, i.e. to ﬁrm-initiated issues. Limiting
the sample to SEOs has the further advantage that an announcement event
can be clearly identiﬁed. I reconﬁrm that SEO announcements do, in fact,
convey information, since event returns are, on average, strongly signiﬁcantly
negative. To measure the sign of the information conveyed, I interpret neg-
ative event return as bad news and the less frequent positive event return
as good news. This enables me to determine to what extent information
conveyed at event time is fully incorporated in prices at event time.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I
discuss what could drive issuer underperformance. I show how information
asymmetry at event time can cause underperformance at event time and
subsequently, and I present an alternative - that underperformance is caused
by underreaction to news at event time. Section 3 presents data and vari-
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ables used. Section 4 presents average issuer returns before and after issue,
conﬁrming high abnormal return pre-issue, negative abnormal event return,
and negative abnormal return post-issue. In Section 5, event returns are
regressed on characteristics hypothesized to explain event return. Section 6
examines the explanations behind issuer long-run abnormal returns. Two
diﬀerent methodologies are applied. First, buy and hold abnormal returns,
calculated relative to diﬀerent factor models, are regressed on characteris-
tics hypothesized to explain long-run return. Second, issuers are sorted on
these characteristics and calendar-time portfolios of issuers, and long-short
calendar-time portfolios of issuers matched with non-issuers, are constructed.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 What Drives Issuer Underperformance?
This section discusses possible reasons for issuer underperformance. Sec-
tion 2.1 explains how information asymmetry at event time may drive subse-
quent negative abnormal returns, while Section 2.2 explores how investor un-
derreaction, in the absence of information asymmetry, may drive subsequent
underperformance. Based on these two sections, hypotheses are presented
in Section 2.3. Two of the hypotheses concern the relation between issuer
overvaluation and whether the issuer is constained, respectively, and long-run
abnormal return. Proxies for issuer overvaluation and issuer constrainedness
are presented in Section 2.4 and 2.5.
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2.1 Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry as a driver of returns in connection with stock issues
was ﬁrst proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), henceforth MM, and is also
the driver for negative long-run returns in Loughran and Ritter (1995).2 To
understand the relationship between information asymmetry, issuance event
return and long-run return, consider the MM model. Firms have assets in
place with per share value a ≥ 0 and an investment opportunity with per
share net present value b ≥ 0, which cannot be postponed and which must
be ﬁnanced with equity E, per share, raised from new investors.3 Firm
management acts in the interest of old shareholders. At event time ﬁrm
management knows the realization of a and b, while investors only know the
distribution of a and b.
Figure 1 depicts the ﬁrms' issuance decision. The ﬁrms' choice of whether
to issue or not depends on a linear combination of the realization of a and
b. In particular, ﬁrms will issue if a is suﬃciently low or b is suﬃciently
high. It is natural to think of this as two diﬀerent reasons to issue: to exploit
overvaluation or to pursue attractive investment possibilities. The issue price
is P ′ and new investors will experience positive post-issue returns if a + b
exceeds P ′ (the region in M ′ above the dotted line) and negative post-issue
returns otherwise (the region in M ′ below the dotted line). If investors have
rational expectations, the equilibrium price P ′ must be E(a+b|(a, b) ∈ I) and
2While these two papers share the assumption that ﬁrm management knows much more
than investors at event time, i.e. after an issue has been announced, they diﬀer in terms
of whether investors realize this. In MM investors realize their ignorance and purchase
new equity at its expected value, taking into account that ﬁrms are more likely to issue
when they are overvalued than when they are undervalued. In Loughran and Ritter (1995)
investors do not fully realize their ignorance and overpay for new equity.
3In MM, these values are not per share but for the entire ﬁrm. Without loss of gener-
ality, I assume the ﬁrm has one share outstanding before issue and that the ﬁrm can issue
any fraction of shares.
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average post-issue abnormal return will be 0. Accordingly, the MM model
predicts negative event return because the expected value of a+b conditioned
on (a, b) ∈ I is lower than the unconditional expectation of a+b, but does not
predict negative long-run returns because investors have rational expectation.
In order to generate long-run underperformance due to information asym-
metry, a deviation from rational expectations is required, i.e. if average post-
issue return is negative, it implies that investors pay too much for new equity
and, consequently, that the marginal investor does not fully incorporate the
impact of information asymmetry. Several behavioral biases may generate
this result including those which may generate underreaction, as discussed
in Section 1. Regardless of whether issuers, on average, underperform, the
MM model predicts that long-run return will be lowest for issuers with low
a+ b, i.e. overvalued issuers.
Moving beyond the MM model, some issuers may also have the ability
to issue during periods where the market value of their equity is particularly
high, as suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1995), McLean et al. (2009) and
Greenwood and Hanson (2012). Empirically, these issuers have particularly
low subsequent returns.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
2.2 Investor Underreaction
In the above model information asymmetry, in combination with oppor-
tunistic issuers and some deviation from rational expectations on the side
of investors, explains negative average post-issue return. However, what if
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information asymmetry between ﬁrm management and issuers is low when
issues occur? There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to consider
this possibility.
Miller and Rock (1985), henceforth MR, consider a situation where in-
vestors know the distribution of current earnings but ﬁrm management know
the actual realization. Future earnings depend on current investments and
the production function is concave. They develop a fully revealing signaling
equilibrium where ﬁrms signal earnings with payouts.4 Since stock issues
are negative payouts, an issue signals low earnings. Investors interpret the
signal correctly and announcement returns will be positive or negative, de-
pending on whether the earnings signaled are higher or lower than investors'
(unobserved) expectations.
In terms of issuance, MR and MM diﬀer in two important ways. First,
while MM always predicts negative event returns, event returns may by pos-
itive in MR provided that the issue is smaller than expected by investors.
In this case, MR investors will interpret the issue as god news. Second,
while both models are rational expectations models with on long-run issuer
underperformance, the equilibrium in MR is fully revealing in the sense that
4Period t earnings are given by Xt = f(It−1) + t, where f is the production function,
It−1 previous period investments and t a random increment with zero mean. It = Xt +
Bt − Dt where Bt is time t ﬁnancing and Dt payouts (dividends, stock repurchases or
stock issues), respectively. At time t ﬁrm management knows Xt but investors know only
f(It−1). Firm management acts partly in the interest of investors who will sell their equity
before Xt is revealed, i.e. those who want to maximize current share price, and partly in
the interest of investors who will stay invested, i.e. those who want the ﬁrm to invest
optimally. In the fully revealing equilibrium ﬁrms use Dt to signal Xt. Payouts will be
higher and investments lower than under the Fisher rule, but because f ′′ < 0 smaller
deviations from the Fisher rule will be cheaper, in term of lost future earnings, than larger
deviations. Hence, it will not be optimal for ﬁrms with low earnings to pay as large payouts
as ﬁrms with high earnings.
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ﬁrm management successfully eliminates the information asymmetry at event
time. This is not possible in the MM model.
Moving beyond MR, low or no information asymmetry at event time and
subsequent issuer underperformance can be reconciled if investors do not
fully incorporate available information in prices immediately. In this case,
there will be post announcement drift and event returns will predict long-
run returns. Moreover, among ﬁrms with the most negative signals (largest
issues), ﬁrms which fall short of investors' expectations will outnumber ﬁrms
which exceed investors' expectations. Consequently, larger issues will be
associated with more negative event and long-run returns.5
Issues rarely occur without other news being released. Hence, payout (is-
sue size) is not the only signal captured by investors. First, there are legal and
stock exchange ﬁling, disclosure and prospectus requirements on information
which must be released in connection with an issue.6 Second, in addition to
the required information, ﬁrms have an incentive to reduce the information
asymmetry as this will improve the pricing or probability of success of the
new issue. Roadshows and investor meetings are used for this purpose. Even
when ﬁrms have some ability to conceal negative information, doing so may
not be optimal if the ﬁrm expects to raise equity at future occasions. More-
over, concealing information or failure to supply relevant information may
lead to future lawsuits. Third, often issues involve investment banks who
underwrite or place the issue with their clients. These are hurt ﬁnancially
or reputationally if the issue is overpriced. Consequently, they will conduct
5The prediction that larger issues are perceived more negatively than smaller issues is
not unique for the MR model. Krasker (1986) extends the MM with variable issue size
and shows that event returns will be more negative for larger issues. A liquidity based
model would also predict that a larger issue would carry a larger price impact.
6See Eckbo et al. (2007) for a comprehensive review of the security oﬀering process.
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independent research on the issuer. Fourth, when an issue occur investors
will be particularly keen on acquiring available information and doing their
own independent research.
2.3 Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes the two pathological cases of a world where all event
and post-event return is driven by information asymmetry at event time, as
discussed in Section 2.1, and a world without information asymmetry at event
time where all event and post-event return is driven by investor underreaction
to the issue, and possibly other news at event time, as discussed in Section 2.2.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Both situations considered in Table 1 may, to some extent, explain em-
pirical ﬁndings. Firms may have some ability to credibly signal fundamental
value and investors some ability to reduce the information asymmetry. Some
information asymmetry may remain, and opportunistic ﬁrms may try to ex-
ploit this and some may be successful at it. The empirical predictions of
the two situations can be used to test which best describes the real world. I
formalize this in the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
If information asymmetry is high at event time and opportunistic issuers are
able to exploit this, then proxies for issuer overvaluation will be negatively
related to long-run abnormal return.
123
Hypothesis 2
If information asymmetry is high at event time and opportunistic issuers are
able to exploit this, then proxies for issuer constrainedness will be positively
related to long-run abnormal return.
Hypothesis 3
If investors underreact at event time, then event return and, in particular,
its negative component will be positively related to long-run abnormal return.
Hypothesis 4
If information asymmetry is large at event time or if investors underreact at
event time, then larger issues will be negatively related to long-run abnormal
return.
If the empirical results support Hypothesis 1 and 2, this can be taken
as evidence for information asymmetry as explanation for issuer underper-
formance. If the empirical results support Hypothesis 3, this can be taken
as evidence for investor underreaction as explanation for issuer underper-
formance. Hypothesis 4 does not enable to distinguish between these two
explanations as both predicts larger issues to be associated with lower long-
run returns.
In order to test these hypotheses, a measure of long-run abnormal return
is needed. This is discussed in Section 3. Hypothesis 1 requires a proxy for
issuer valuation. This is the topic of Section 2.4. Proxies for issuer con-
strainedness used to test Hypothesis 2 are discussed treated in Section 2.5.7
7Overvaluation and constrainedness are characteristics which are clearly diﬃcult to
124
Event return and the decomposition of event return into its positive and
negative component (Hypothesis 3) as well as the measure of large issues
(Hypothesis 4) is covered in Section 3.
2.4 Proxies for Overvaluation
Testing Hypothesis 1 requires a proxy for issuer overvaluation. Previous
research has suggested a number of proxies but no consensus seems to have
emerged.8 Lee et al. (1999), Dong et al. (2006), and Dong et al. (2012) use
the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to measure overvaluation. The
residual income model states that the value of the equity of the ﬁrm is its
book value plus the discounted value of any future income in excess of the
cost of equity of book value. 9 The calculated fundamental value is compared
to market value to determine the level of overvaluation. Dong et al. (2012)
use analyst expectations for the next three years' income and required return
is calculated with the CAPM model using market β estimated over the past
ﬁve years and 30 years past market excess return. Since 30 years market
excess return is not very volatile and the ﬁrms' market value may incorporate
expected residual income for much more than three years, innovations in
the Dong et al. (2012) overvaluation measure will be highly correlated with
past return and the level of overvaluation will be highly correlated with the
market-to-book ratio.
observe. Results will depend on the quality of the proxies used. If empirical tests to not
support Hypothesis 1 or 2, one cannot rule out, that this is due to inadequate proxies.
8This is hardly surprising. If it was easy to detect overvaluation, creating abnormal
returns would be much easier than empirical evidence suggests that it is.
9Vt = Bt +
∞∑
s=1
Et(RIt+s)
(1+k)s , where Vt and Bt are fundamental value and book value,
respectively and k is required return on equity. Et(RIt+s) is the time t expectation of
residual income deﬁned as RIt = NIt − kBt−1, where NIt is time t net income.
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Fu et al. (2013), using a method developed by RhodesKropf et al. (2005),
run annual industry-speciﬁc cross-sectional regressions where the logarithm
of market value is regressed on the logarithm of log book value, net income
and ﬁrm leverage measured in market values. The estimated regression coef-
ﬁcients are used to calculate the fundamental value of individual stocks and
determine to what extent they are overvalued.10
Carlson et al. (2010) develop a model in which stock prices depend on
fundamental value, market-wide mispricing and stock-speciﬁc mispricing. In
their model, the normalized time t price of stock i, denoted Pit is the sum of
three independent components
Pit = biFt + St + uit
Here, bi is a parameter summarizing the importance of fundamentals relative
to sentiment for stock i, Ft and St are the marketwide fundamental and
sentiment factors, respectively, and uit the idiosyncratic misprising. They
use this model to make predictions for market β dynamics before and after
issue, but it may also be used to motivate that price Pit innovations is a
proxy for mispricing innovations (market-wide St or idiosyncratic uit) and
that abnormal return is a proxy for innovations in idiosyncratic mispricing
uit.
The market-to-book ratio is used as proxy for overvaluation in DeAngelo
et al. (2010) and Dong et al. (2006). The former also uses abnormal stock
return, calculated as issuer return less market return, prior to issue as proxies
for overvaluation. Akbulut (2013) uses managers' insider trading activity to
10RhodesKropf et al. (2005) show that mergers occur in waves contemporaneous with
market-wide overvaluations.
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measure overvaluation. Some papers (DeAngelo et al. (2010), Loughran and
Ritter (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002)) also use future stock return as
a proxy for overvaluation. Though this may be the ultimate measure of
overvaluation in other contexts, it can clearly not be used to predict future
abnormal return.
As the discussion above suggests, most proxies for overvaluation are
closely related to the market-to-book ratio or issuer return prior to issue.
Some proxies measure overvaluation relative to the market, while others con-
sider the possibility that the market may also be overvalued. In this paper,
I decompose issuer return before issue into return explained by exposure to
priced factors, market excess return, as well as other factors, and other re-
turn, which, for convenience I denote abnormal return. High market return
will be interpreted as a market-wide reduction in required return, which,
in turn, implies that investment opportunities, all else being equal, become
more attractive. Abnormal return will be interpreted a proxy for idiosyn-
cratic overvaluation.
Two salient empirical facts are consistent with these proxies. If idiosyn-
cratic overvaluation is independent of marketwide overvaluation, as in the
Carlson et al. (2010) model, the number of ﬁrms with idiosyncratic overval-
uation is approximately constant over time, while the number of ﬁrms with
attractive investment opportunities is positively related to aggregate market
valuation. This implies that aggregate issuance activity should be positively
related to past market return. Figure 2 shows the trailing 12-month number
of issuers and trailing 12-month market excess return. The number of issuers
is clearly increasing during the period. As noted by Pontiﬀ and Woodgate
(2008), the relatively low number of SEOs in the early part of the sample
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may reﬂect limited coverage in SDC before approximately 1990. Despite this
the correlation between market excess return and number of issuers is 0.40
(t-value 9.1). Second, since overvalued ﬁrms are more likely to issue, issuers
will, on average, have past positive abnormal returns. In Section 4, I show
that issuers have, on average, very high abnormal returns before issue. Both
these patterns have been known since Loughran and Ritter (1995).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
2.5 Proxies for Constrainedness
Testing Hypothesis 2 requires a proxy for issuer constrainedness. Constrained-
ness implies that the issuers had to issue to continue operations, i.e. to ﬁnance
operations or to service current debt. At the extreme, these ﬁrms must raise
new equity to avoid bankruptcy and protect some value for current share-
holders. I denote these defensive issuers because they must issue to survive,
whereas other issuers choose to issue to pursue attractive investment possi-
bilities or exploit overpricing. In Section 3, I present a number of measures
for the extent to which an issuer is defensive. Most of these consider to what
extent the ﬁrm can pay oﬀ current debt with existing cash and cashﬂow from
operations and the level of cashﬂow from operations.11
Hypothesis 2 implies that defensive issuers will have higher long-run ab-
normal returns than other issuers. One may be concerned that other return-
predicting characteristics of defensive issuers systematically diﬀer from non-
defensive issuers. In particular, defensive issuers may have lower proﬁtability.
Since high proﬁtability, for example, measured as exposure to the Fama and
11Current debt is debt due within a year.
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French (2015) RMW factor, is a strong return predictor, it is essential to con-
trol for this in abnormal return calculations. Another concern with the testa-
bility of Hypothesis 2 is that Baker et al. (2003) show that . . . the eﬀects of
stock market valuations (eﬃcient or otherwise) on investment are greater for
more ﬁnancially constrained (equity dependent) ﬁrms. Since ﬁrms which
issue when market valuations are high subsequently have particular low re-
turns (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), this could drive underperformance of
defensive issuers. Therefore, it is important to control for past market return
when the relation between defensiveness of the issuer and long-run return is
analyzed.
3 Data and Variables
3.1 SEO Sample
Daily and monthly stock returns are sourced from CRSP. Only ordinary eq-
uity is selected.12 The CRSP Compustat merge was used to obtain account-
ing data. Only annual accounting data are used and all accounting data are
lagged by at least six months. Daily and monthly market excess returns as
well as factor returns (SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and WML), were collected
from Kenneth French homepage.
SEO events were gathered from the SDC Platinum database available
through Thomson One Banker. The sample contains all completed SEOs (in
SDC denoted Follow-On oﬀerings) with issue date in 2015 or earlier. The
relative issue size, i.e. proceeds raised divided by the market value before the
12First digit of the CRSP shrcd code is 1.
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oﬀer, both as reported in SDC, is denoted Issue.13 Observations where Issue
cannot be calculated are discarded. Moreover, I require Issue to be at least
3%. This is to eliminate very small issues with limited information content.
It reduces the sample by around 8%, with limited impact on empirical results.
Issuers with pre-oﬀer valuation of less than $100 million in CPI adjusted
December 2015 prices are removed from the sample. This is to eliminate
phenomena which only exist in micro caps. It reduces the sample by around
11% with limited impact on most empirical results. Finally, ﬁnancials and
insurance companies are eliminated from the sample.14
The SEO announcement date is the Original date reported by SDC.
I have, for a small sample of records, veriﬁed that this date is indeed the
day the issue was announced. Occasionally, SDC records more than one
SEO event for a given ﬁrm with a given announcement date. These diﬀerent
records typically represent issues in diﬀerent markets, to diﬀerent investor
groups or using diﬀerent issuance methods. In any case, these records are
merged into one SEO observation. CRPS and SDC observations are matched
based on their cusip number. The matched sample consists of 11,106 SEO
observations. Figure 2 shows how the number of observations, satisfying the
criteria mentioned, has evolved since 1980.
3.2 Abnormal return
Issuer abnormal returns are used in a number of sorts and regressions as a
dependent as well as an explanatory variable. In all cases, abnormal return
13Issue is calculated using the SDC variables Proceeds__Amt___sum__of_all_Mkts and
Market_Value_Before_Offer____mil. The latter is also used together with the CRSP
CPIIND variable to calculate ﬁrm market value at December 2015 prices.
14Issuers with Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation Code between 6000 and 6499.
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over period p is calculated as
rpabn,MM = r
p
excess −
∑
i∈MM
βˆpi r
p
i (1)
rpexcess is the return in excess of the risk-free rate. Market modelMM is a
set of return-predicting factors, rpi is the return of factor i over period p and
βˆpi is the estimated exposure to factor i. I primarily consider the Fama-French
ﬁve factor model (Fama and French, 2015), denoted FF5, but occasionally
also consider other models including the Fama-French three factor model,
denoted FF3, and CAPM.
For abnormal returns before and at issuance announcement event time,
factor loadings βˆpi are estimated using daily excess returns from one year
before announcement to one month before announcement. For abnormal
returns after issue, factor loadings are estimated using data from one month
after announcement to one year after announcement.15 In both cases, excess
returns are regressed on factor returns with three daily lags and the estimated
loading βˆpi is the sum of estimated loadings on the contemporaneous factor
return and the three lagged factor returns (the Dimson (1979) method).
Factor loadings are only estimated with at least 200 degrees of freedom in
the regressions, i.e. when ﬁrm returns are available almost daily.16
Table 2 reports average FF5 estimated factor loadings before and after
issue. Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1995), issuer market betas are
slightly above 1. βˆMkt is 1.10 before issue, increasing to 1.13 after. The
increase of 0.03 is small but statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that issuers,
15In most cases the issue date is either the announcement data or the day after.
16Estimating FF5 loadings requires 221 observations: one for the model intercept, ﬁve for
contemporaneous factor returns, 15 for lagged factor returns plus 200 degrees of freedom.
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on average, do not issue to strengthen their balance sheet but rather to
invest. Consistent with results reported by Greenwood and Hanson (2012),
the average issuer is small cap. Issuers load heavily on SMB with βˆSMB of
0.81 before and 0.76 after. The decrease is as expected, since issues increase
the market value of the ﬁrm. βˆHML decreases from -0.07 to -0.13, again
suggesting that issuers invest rather than strengthen their balance sheet.
This also applies to the decrease in the asset growth factor βˆCMA from -
0.07 to -0.15, i.e. issuers become more aggressive post-issue. Greenwood and
Hanson (2012) also report low issuer proﬁtability. The table reﬂects this,
with βˆRMW loadings of -0.31 before and -0.40 after issue.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3.3 Dependent and Explanatory Variables in Regres-
sions
In the event regressions, Section 5, the dependent variable is abnormal event
returns, reventabn,FF5 calculated using equation 1 and event excess return r
event
excess.
Regressors are past market excess return (r−n yearMkt , n ∈ {1, 2, 3}), measured
from one, two and three years before announcement to one month before an-
nouncement and issuer abnormal return prior to announcement (r−n yearabn,FF5, n ∈
{1, 2, 3}), measured from one, two and three years before to one month be-
fore announcement. Further regressors are issue = log(1 + Issue) and the
logarithm of equity market value (denoted mv).
In long-run abnormal return regressions reported in Section 6.1 one-,
two- and three-year post-announcement abnormal returns, denoted r1yearabn,FF5,
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r2yearabn,FF5 and r
3year
abn,FF5, respectively, are regressed on factors hypothesized to
explain (and predict) long-run return. The abnormal returns are calculated
from one month after announcement to one, two and three years after an-
nouncement using factor exposures estimated post-announcement and mar-
ket models FF5. In addition to the regressors mentioned above, abnormal
event return is used as regressor in long-run abnormal return regressions.
Further abnormal event return is decomposed into its positive and negative
component revent+abn,FF5 = max(r
event
abn,FF5, 0) and r
event−
abn,FF5 = max(−reventabn,FF5, 0).
The purpose of this is to determine whether positive event returns, i.e. good
news conveyed at event time, aﬀect long-run returns diﬀerently than neg-
ative event returns, i.e. bad news conveyed at event time. In the entire
sample, 26% of the events have positive event return and the annual fraction
is almost always between 20% and 40% with a downward sloping trend over
the past 15 years.
In Section 6.1.2 long-run abnormal return is regressed on proxies for being
a defensive issuer, in addition to the explanatory variables mentioned above.
Table 3 summarizes characteristics related to whether the issue is likely to be
defensive. In all cases, low values are associated with more defensive issues.
The cash ratio CR measures the ratio between cash and current debt, i.e.
debt due within one year.17 To eliminate the impact of extreme observations,
the calculated cash ratio is projected on the interval [0, 5]. CR1 is a binary
variable measuring whether cash exceeds current debt.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
17CR is calculated using the Compustat variables ch and dlc lagged by at least six
months.
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The cash and cashﬂow ratio CCF is the ratio between cash plus operating
cashﬂow and debt.18 CCF is projected on the interval [−5, 5]. The binary
variable CCF1 is one if cash plus operating cashﬂow exceeds current debt,
and zero otherwise. The cashﬂow yield CFY is the ratio between operating
cashﬂow and issuer market value. The binary variable PosCF is 0 if operating
cashﬂow is negative, and 1 otherwise.
Firms without any long-term debt are also likely to be defensive issuers
because the lack of any debt may be caused by inability to borrow. The
binary variable LTDebt is 0 for issuers without any long-term debt and 1
otherwise.19 Finally, dividend paying issuers, i.e. issuers which have paid
a dividend over the year before issue, are likely to be less defensive than
non-dividend paying issuers. PosDiv is 0 for issuers which have not paid a
dividend, and 1 otherwise.
A substantial number of issuers delist within three years after issue. In
long-run abnormal regressions, proceeds including delisting returns, as re-
ported by CRSP, is assumed to be reinvested in the market portfolio. In
unreported results, delisting ﬁrms were omitted from the sample. This does
not change the results substantially. In the calendar-time portfolios, delisting
issuers are removed from portfolios at the ﬁrst monthly rebalancing after the
delisting. Delisting returns, as reported by CRSP, are included in the last
monthly return.
18CCR is calculated using the Compustat variables ch, dlc, and oancf lagged by at
least six month.
19The Compustat variable dltt is used for long-term debt.
134
4 Returns Before and After Issue
This section brieﬂy reviews average issuer abnormal return before and after
issue, conﬁrming previous ﬁndings of high abnormal returns before issue and
negative abnormal returns post-issue. Figure 3 shows the average cumulated
abnormal return, using CAPM as market model, of issuers from 20 trading
days before announcement (day -20) to 20 trading days after announcement
(day 20). From day -20 to the day before announcement, cumulated abnormal
returns exceeds 5%. On the two subsequent days, i.e. the announcement
date and the day after, average abnormal returns are below -2% followed
by a rebound of about 0.75% over the next two weeks. All these results are
strongly signiﬁcant and the pattern does not change much if abnormal return
is calculated with respect to FF3 or FF5. The ﬁgure motivates calculating
event returns over the two-day time window consisting of the announcement
date and the subsequent day.20
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 4 shows the abnormal return index of issuers, i.e. issuers hedged
with their exposures to the CAPM, FF3 and FF5 factors, respectively, from
12 months before announcement to 36 months after announcement normal-
ized at 100 on announcement date. Abnormal returns are almost 60% (from
around index 63 to index 100) the year before announcement regardless of
market model. After issue performance depends on market model. Control-
ling for market exposure only, issuers record abnormal returns of -22% on
average over three years in line with results reported by Loughran and Ritter
20In some cases, the announcement was made after close on the announcement date.
Hence, the negative return on day t+ 1 cannot be interpreted as a delayed reaction.
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(1995), but adding further controls, in particular the CMA and RMW fac-
tors of FF5 changes the picture somewhat. Over one year issuer abnormal
returns are insigniﬁcant 1% relative to FF5 and only -10% over three years.
As hinted by Table 2, the diﬀerence is chieﬂy explained by issuers negative
loading on the proﬁtability factor RMW.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
5 Event Returns
As motivated in Section 3, abnormal announcement event returns reventabn,FF5
are calculated as the abnormal return on the announcement date and the
subsequent trading day. Table 4 shows the results of regressions of abnormal
event returns (speciﬁcation 1 to 6) as well as excess event returns (speciﬁ-
cation 7) on 1, 2, and 3 past years' market excess return, 1, 2 and 3 past
years' issuer abnormal return as well as log relative issue size issue and log
market value mv. Since event return periods may overlap, standard errors
are calculated using the Newey-West correction of standard errors for het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation using three lags. All regressors are nor-
malized (z-scores), hence regression intercepts can be interpreted as event
abnormal return.
Across speciﬁcations (1) to (6), FF5 abnormal event return is about -2.3%
and highly signiﬁcant. Past years' market excess return is only signiﬁcant
for market excess return over three years (speciﬁcation (3)) with a coeﬃcient
estimate of 0.2, i.e. a one standard deviation change in past three-year market
excess return is associated with about 20 bps higher event returns. If high
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market return pre-issue is a proxy for attractive investment possibilities, one
would expect the coeﬃcient to be positive, as it is in all speciﬁcations.
Past years' abnormal return is signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations with co-
eﬃcient estimates around 0.15, showing that one standard deviation higher
past year(s) abnormal return is associated with about 15 bps higher event
returns.
Relative issue issue is insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, i.e. proceeds raised
relative to market value is not signiﬁcantly related to event return. Issuer
market value is signiﬁcant, with estimates between 0.32 and 0.35, i.e. larger
issuers have higher (less negative) event returns. This is consistent with
larger issuers being more analyzed, hence, on average, less information is
conveyed at announcement time.
All these conclusions are largely unchanged in regressions of raw event
returns (speciﬁcation 7) instead of abnormal event returns.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
6 Long-run Returns
This section analyzes to what extent issuer long-run returns can be explained
and predicted. There are two diﬀerent approaches frequently applied in the
literature. The Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) method involves
measuring the buy and hold abnormal return issue by issue and trying to
explain these by issuer characteristics and other variables in regressions or
sorts. Issuer BHAR is either measured as the return diﬀerence between
the issuer and a comparable ﬁrm (the matched ﬁrm approach) or between
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the issuer and a portfolio with the same risk characteristics as the issuer
(equation 1). In Section 6.1, I calculate BHAR using the latter approach,
with FF5 as market model and factor exposures estimated from one month
after announcement to one year after announcement because the matched
ﬁrm approach, as pointed out by Eckbo et al. (2000) and Bessembinder and
Zhang (2013), makes it diﬃcult to control for exposure to factors beyond the
usual matching criteria of size and book-to-market ratio.
The calendar-time portfolio method involves forming portfolios, for exam-
ple, monthly, of ﬁrms which have carried out an issue during the past year
(or two or three years). Portfolio excess returns are calculated and regressed
on factor excess returns to determine factor loadings and possible abnormal
returns. In Section 6.2, I construct long portfolios of all issuers as well as
long portfolios sorted on issuer characteristics. In Section 6.3, I construct
long-short portfolios, where each long position in an issuer is matched with a
short position in a non-issuer matched on market value and book-to-market
ratio.
With the calendar-time portfolio method, the weight assigned to each is-
sue depends on the number of contemporaneous issues. In particular, obser-
vations during a period with few issues receive a disproportionally high weight
and phenomena which are particularly strong during periods of heavy is-
suance activity may not be signiﬁcant. For this, and other, reasons, Loughran
and Ritter (2000) discard the calendar-time portfolios for having low power.
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) strongly advocate the calendar-
time approach due to inherent methodological problems in the BHAR ap-
proach including skewness of individual long-run returns and overlapping
return periods. Without taking a stance on this debate, I apply long-run
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BHAR regressions in Section 6.1 and the calendar-time portfolio approach
in Section 6.2. However, results do not diﬀer qualitatively between the two
approaches, but the calendar-time portfolio approach show lower power, as
expected.
6.1 Long-run BHAR Regressions
In this section, the BHAR method is applied. In 6.1.1, abnormal return is
regressed on past market and past issuer abnormal return. Other explanatory
variables are event return, log market value and log issue size. This is to
test hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 which predict a relationship between long-run
abnormal return and issuer overvaluation, event return and relative issue size,
respectively. In 6.1.2, abnormal return is regressed on proxies for defensive
issues to determine whether defensive issuers, as Hypothesis 2 would suggest,
fare better than non-defensive issuers.
6.1.1 Past Market and Abnormal Returns
This section reports equally weighted regressions with BHAR one, two and
three years after announcement as dependent variable. Table 5 reports re-
sults using the FF5 market model for abnormal return calculation. Due to
overlapping return intervals and possibly heteroscedastic errors, standard er-
rors are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) correction. The number
of lags is calculated using the West (1994) approximation, which yields ten
lags.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
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Panel A speciﬁcation (1) to (5) displays the result of one-year abnormal
return after issue BHAR1yearFF5 regressed on market excess return and issuer
abnormal return one, two and three years before announcement(r−n yearMkt and
r−n yearabn,FF5 respectively, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}), in both cases excluding the last month
before announcement. Regressors are normalized, hence the intercept can be
interpreted as abnormal return. Consistent with Figure 4, one-year abnor-
mal return is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. While past market excess
return is insigniﬁcant, past abnormal return over one and two years is sig-
niﬁcant, with coeﬃcient estimates between 2.46 and 2.93 showing that a one
standard deviation increase in pre-issue abnormal return is associated with
2.46% to 2.93% higher abnormal return the following year.
Speciﬁcation (6) shows that event abnormal return reventabn,FF5 is signiﬁcant
with a size comparable to pre-issue abnormal return. Relative issue issue is
insigniﬁcant, and log market value mv is strongly signiﬁcant. In speciﬁcation
(7) event return is decomposed into its positive and negative component.
This reveals a positive but insigniﬁcant relation between positive event return
and post-issue abnormal return and a strong signiﬁcant relation between
negative event return and post-issue abnormal return.21
Two- and three-year abnormal return regressions are reported in Panel B
and C. Abnormal return is signiﬁcantly negative, 4-5% over two years and
about 12% over three years. One- and two-year pre-issue excess market re-
turn becomes gradually more signiﬁcant. Two years after issue, past market
performance (r−1yearMkt and r
−2year
Mkt ) is negatively signiﬁcant in most speciﬁca-
tions and three years after issue it is almost always signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
21The regression intercept in speciﬁcation (7) diﬀers substantially from speciﬁcation (1)
to (6) and cannot be interpreted as abnormal return due to the calculation of revent+abn,FF5
and revent+abn,FF5. This applies to Panels B and C as well.
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Event return, but only its negative component, and log market value remain
signiﬁcant three years after issue. Relative issue, which was not signiﬁcant
after one year, becomes signiﬁcant and negative after two and three years,
i.e. large issues are associated with lower abnormal return during the second
and third year after issue.
If abnormal return pre-issue is a proxy for overvaluation and Hypothesis
1 holds, then positive abnormal return pre-issue should predict negative ab-
normal return post-issue. However, the empirical evidence contradicts this.
Cross-sectional momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) may explain why
abnormal return one year before issue is positively related to abnormal re-
turn one year after issue, but the persistence of this relationship three years
after issue cannot be explained by momentum due to the long-term reversal
eﬀect ﬁrst documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Consequently, the
results do not conﬁrm Hypothesis 1.
If high market excess return before issue is a proxy for low return re-
quirement, then the evidence suggests that ﬁrms which issue, and possibly
invest, when required return is particular low subsequently underperform.
The underperformance is associated with, and possibly explained by, over-
valuation; not over-valuation of the issuer, but rather over-valuation at the
market level.
While Table 5 provides no support for information asymmetry as an ex-
planation for issuer long-run underperformance, the signiﬁcant relationship
between event abnormal return and long-run abnormal return conﬁrms Hy-
pothesis 3 and suggests some delayed reaction to information conveyed at
event time. Moreover, the fact that only the negative component of event
return signiﬁcantly predicts long-run abnormal return, supports the under-
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reaction explanation since good news is absorbed by prices faster than bad
news. This is consistent with other research showing that negative informa-
tion is reﬂected less readily than positive information (Hong et al. (2000)).
The signiﬁcant relationship between relative issue size issue and two- and
three-year abnormal return conﬁrms Hypothesis 4.
In unreported regressions BHAR and past abnormal return r−n yearabn has
been calculated using the FF3 and CAPM market models. As suggested by
Figure 4 abnormal return is signiﬁcantly negative over one, two, and three
years for FF3 as well as CAPM. Past market return remains negative and
signiﬁcant. Past issuer abnormal return is less signiﬁcant. Event return,
but only its negative component, remains strongly signiﬁcant. Issuer market
value is signiﬁcant at a 1% level in all speciﬁcations while relative issue size is
highly signiﬁcant for three-year BHAR but insigniﬁcant for one-year BHAR
in line with Table 5.
6.1.2 Defensive versus non-Defensive Issues
If opportunistic issuers exploit information asymmetry to issue overvalued
equity, they must have some ability to time their issues to a period where
they are overvalued. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 predicts that less constrained
issuers subsequently underperform relative to issuers which are more con-
strained. Constrainedness is not directly observable. Instead I distinguish
between issuers who appear to be forced to issue to avoid bankruptcy (de-
noted defensive issuers) and issuers without this constraint (denoted non-
defensive issuers).
Table 6 reports regressions of one, two and three years buy-and-hold
abnormal returns on proxies for being being defensive, cf. Table 3, as well
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as the regressors used in speciﬁcation (7) in Table 5, i.e. past-year market
excess return, past-year issuer abnormal return, the positive and negative
component of event return, issue, and mv. Over one year (Panel A) none
of the defensive issuer characteristics are signiﬁcant, but all have positive
coeﬃcient estimates, indicating that non-defensive issuers have higher returns
than defensive issuers over the year after issue. Over two years (Panel B)
and three years (Panel C), this pattern becomes clearer. Coeﬃcient estimates
remain positive, and over three years all characteristics with some relation to
operating cashﬂow are signiﬁcant. Issuers with suﬃcient cash plus operating
cashﬂow to cover current debt have 14% higher returns than issuers with
insuﬃcient cash and cashﬂow, over the following three years. Issuers with
positive operating cashﬂow have an 18% higher return than issuers with
negative cashﬂow over the following three years. These results contradicts
that defensive issuers fare better than non-defensive issuers over the three
years after issue. Hence, there is no empirical evidence of Hypothesis 2.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Using FF3 or CAPM as market model increases the signiﬁcance of the
results reported in Table 6. Cashﬂow related characteristics are generally
signiﬁcant for one-, two-, and three-year BHAR and longterm debt LTDebt
as well as dividend payments PosDiv is signiﬁcant for all BHAR periods and
in most cases on a 1% level. The stronger results using the FF3 and CAPM
market models is no surprise. Defensive issuers are likely to have weaker
proﬁtability, and possibly faster asset growth, than other issuers. Without
controlling for these factors, the underperformance of defensive issuers be-
comes even stronger.
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6.2 Issuer Calendar-time Portfolios
The results reported in Section 6.1 are consistent with Hypothesis 3, i.e.
investor underreaction to news at event time explain long-run underperfor-
mance of issuers. Hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e. information asymmetry and op-
portunistic issues as an explanation for long-run issuer underperformance,
found no empirical support. The results also support Hypothesis 4, which
is consistent with informations asymmetry as well as with investor under-
reaction. The purpose of this section is to conﬁrm these ﬁndings using the
calendar-time method. Section 6.2.1 considers the calendar-time portfolio of
all issuers while calendar-time portfolios constructed based on sorts on issuer
characteristics are reported in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 The Portfolio of All Issuers
Issuers are assigned to the calendar-time portfolio of all issuers from the
second month after announcement, i.e. if announcement date is January 29,
the ﬁrm will be assigned to a portfolio from March. Portfolios are equal-
weighted, with monthly rebalancing and issuers remain in portfolios for one,
two and three years. Since the dataset contains relatively few issues prior
to 1980, portfolios are formed from January 1980. Figure 5 shows how $100
invested in a portfolio consisting of all issuers, with holding periods of one,
two and three years, respectively, has evolved. For comparison, the evolution
of $100 in the market portfolio is shown. While the value of an investment in
the market portfolio almost 50-doubles over the 36 years from 1980 to 2015,
the return on the issuer portfolios is between 574% and 1038%.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
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Figure 5 suggests that issuers have negative abnormal return, but Table 7
shows that this depends on the market model used. Consider the one-year
holding period portfolio. Speciﬁcation (1) and (2) show that relative to
CAPM and FF3 underperformance is strongly signiﬁcant at -44 bps and -
35 bps monthly, respectively. Controlling for proﬁtability (RMW) and asset
growth (CMA) underperformance drops to an insigniﬁcant -15 bps, cf. spec-
iﬁcation (3). The portfolio has a signiﬁcant negative loading on the momen-
tum factor (WML). Controlling for this further reduces underperformance
to -10 bps. Two- and three-year holding period portfolios are considered in
Panel B and C. Consistent with Figure 4, issuer abnormal return is lower for
longer holding periods. Underperformance relative to FF5 is signiﬁcant at
-27 bps and -25 bps, respectively.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
These results are consistent with Lyandres et al. (2008) and Bessembinder
and Zhang (2013), who report that issuer underperformance, to a large ex-
tent, disappears when controlling for appropriate factors known to predict
return. The regressions also show that issuers on average have market βs
above one and are small cap, consistent Table 2. Loadings on RMW, CMA,
and WML are negative and strongly signiﬁcant.
The BHAR regressions of Section 6.1.1 showed that past market excess
return is negatively related to long-run issuer performance. Past market ex-
cess return is not a suitable portfolio sort variable because all issues at the
same time will simultaneously have the same past market excess return. In-
stead past market excess return, measured over the past year excluding the
last month, is included as an explanatory variable in the all issuers portfolio
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return regressions reported in Table 8. For all holding periods, past mar-
ket excess return signiﬁcantly predicts issuer portfolio excess returns. An
increase in past year market excess return of 10% is associated with a 14 bps
lower monthly return in the portfolio where issuers are held for one year, 16
bps monthly if issuers are held for two years and 21 bps monthly if issuers
are held for three years. These results are in line with the BHAR return re-
gressions reported in Table 5, though the signiﬁcance of past market return
is stronger in the calendar time portfolio regressions for the shorter holding
periods.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
6.2.2 Portfolios Sorted on Issuer Characteristics
This section considers portfolios constructed by sorts on issuer characteristics
shown to predict post-issue return in Section 6.1. For each characteristic, the
monthly median value for issuers is calculated. Issuers with a characteristic
value below or at the median value are assigned to the low portfolio while
issuers with a characteristic value above the monthly median are assigned to
the high portfolio. This approach ensures that the low and high portfolios
contain approximately the same number of ﬁrms, but the threshold for being
high varies over time. The exceptions to this is event return, where 0 is used
as breakpoint instead of median event return in order to create a good news
and a bad news portfolio, and CCR 1 where the low portfolio consists of
issuers with current debt in excess of cash plus operational cashﬂow and the
high portfolio consists of issuers with less current debt.
Table 9 reports regressions of sort portfolio returns on the FF5 factors.
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Results are reported for the low portfolio, the high portfolio and the self-
ﬁnancing high-low portfolio and for holding periods of one, two, and three
years. The characteristics considered are pre-issue abnormal return r−1yearabn
(Panel A), event abnormal return reventabn (Panel B), relative issue issue (Panel
C) and market value mv (Panel D), cash plus cashﬂow relative to current
debt CCR 1 (Panel E), and cashﬂow yield CFY (Panel F). Firms with several
issues appear only once in the portfolio, but could potentially be included in
the high as well as the low portfolio, if the ﬁrm, for example, has issued
with positive event return as well as with negative event return. Monthly
portfolio excess returns are regressed on factor returns to calculate abnormal
returns relative to FF5.
Table 9 Panel A, shows that the portfolio of high pre-issue abnormal re-
turn issuers has slightly higher abnormal returns than the portfolio of low
pre-issue abnormal return issuers. The diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant for one-
year holding periods with a t-value of 1.87. If returns are regressed on the
momentum factor WML in addition to the FF5 factors, the t-value drops to
1.27 (regression results not shown). The two- and three-year holding period
long-short portfolio has insigniﬁcant loadings on WML and insigniﬁcant ab-
normal returns with and without WML. These results are in line with the
results reported in Section 6.1 and do not support Hypothesis 1.
Panel B conﬁrms that issuers with negative event returns (reventabn ) signif-
icantly underperform issuers with positive event returns by 29 bps monthly
for one-year holding periods. For two- and three-year holding periods under-
performance drops to 19 and 12 bps, respectively, but remains signiﬁcant.
These results conﬁrm Hypothesis 3. Panel C conﬁrms that ﬁrms with large
issues, relative to their market value, underperform relative to ﬁrms with
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smaller issues, as predicted by Hypothesis 4. Results are signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Panel D shows that larger issuers, in terms of mv, have signiﬁcantly
less negative abnormal returns than smaller issuers.
Panel E shows that ﬁrms with low cash plus cashﬂow relative to current
debt underperform issues with more cash or higher cashﬂow. The diﬀerence
is insigniﬁcant for two- and three-year holding periods. Firms with low cash-
ﬂow yield (Panel F) have lower risk-adjusted returns but the diﬀerence is
insigniﬁcant except for two-year holding periods. These results are at odds
with Hypothesis 2 which holds that the least constrained issuers should have
the lowest return. Summing up, the regressions of calendar-time portfolios
sorted on issuer characteristics conﬁrm the ﬁndings of issuer BHAR reported
in Section 6.1, but as expected signiﬁcance decreases with the calendar-time
portfolio approach.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
6.3 Matched Firm Portfolios
As a ﬁnal robustness check, I consider matched ﬁrm portfolios, i.e. portfolios
of long positions in issuers and short positions in ﬁrms matched with issuers.
Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), and previous research, issuers are
matched based on their market value and their book-to-market ratio. The
match is chosen as the ﬁrm with the closest deviation in book-to-market
ratio among ﬁrms with market value of at least 70% and at most 130% of
the issuer.
Match candidates must have been listed for at least ﬁve years and must
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not have issued in a SEO during the past ﬁve years. Moreover match candi-
dates must satisfy the same conditions as issuers, cf. Section 3.1. The match
is based on ﬁrm characteristics at the end of the second month prior to the
SEO announcement date. Section 6.3.1 considers portfolios of all issuers
matched with non-issuers while Section 6.3.2 considers matched portfolios
constructed based on issuer characteristic sorts.
6.3.1 The Matched Portfolio of All Issuers
Figure 6 shows the cumulated return of a self-ﬁnancing long-short, equally
weighted, monthly updated long-short portfolio of SEO ﬁrms matched with
non-SEO ﬁrms, as described above. The issuer and its match are included
in the portfolio for one, two or three years unless the issuer or its match
is delisted. When this happens, both ﬁrms are removed from the portfolio
by the end of the month where the delisting occurs. The ﬁgure conﬁrms the
ﬁndings of Figure 5. Issuers have substantially lower returns than other ﬁrms.
Over the period of 1980-2015 the monthly return diﬀerential is between 16
and 29 bps, depending on holding period. Controlling for exposure to the FF5
factors, the underperformance is 12 bps monthly and insigniﬁcant for one-
year holding periods and 22 bps monthly and highly signiﬁcant for holding
periods of two and three years (Table 10).
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
[Insert Table 10 about here]
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6.3.2 Matched Portfolios Sorted on Issuer Characteristics
Table 11 reports on the performance of portfolios constructed as in Sec-
tion 6.2.2 except that they are self-ﬁnanced portfolios consisting of long po-
sitions in issuers and short positions in matched ﬁrms. Compared to Ta-
ble 9, risk-adjusted returns (regression intercepts) are very similar, and the
diﬀerences between high and low issuer characteristics mostly remain.
Coeﬃcient estimates change only slightly but, in some cases, signiﬁcance
decreases. This is because standard errors increase for two reasons. The
number of issuers in the portfolios decreases because occasionally the match
delists and, more importantly, the volatility of the match portfolio increases
total volatility.22
The spread in risk-adjusted return between issuers with high return before
issue and issuers with low return before issue increases by 15 to 20 bps and
moves into signiﬁcant territory (Panel A). The spread between positive event
return and negative event return issuers decreases by one to seven bps and
moves out of signiﬁcant territory (Panel B).23 The spread between issuers
with large issues and issuers with small issues increases by around 10 bps
and remains signiﬁcant (Panel C). The overperformance of issuers with large
market value relative to issuers with smaller market value decreases by a few
bps but remains signiﬁcant for holding periods of two and three years (Panel
D). The spread between issuers with suﬃcient cash and cashﬂow to service
current debt, and those without, decreases and is only signiﬁcant for holding
22If a portfolio with idiosyncratic volatility σ is hedged with an other portfolio with
idiosyncratic volatility σ, volatility of the hedged portfolio is
√
2σ. The empirical results
show that volatility of the matched portfolios increases by less than a factor
√
2 suggesting
that the matches hedge factors beyond those captured by the FF5 model.
23The diﬀerence between one-year holding period positive and negative event issuers
remains signiﬁcant in the FF3 model (t-value 1.80) as well as over the period 1995 - 2015
(t-statistics 2.12 and 2.55 in the FF5 and FF3 models, respectively).
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periods of two years (Panel E). Finally, the spread between high and low
cashﬂow yield issuers only changes for three-year holding periods and only
by 7 bps.
All portfolios have small positive market exposure with market β's be-
tween 0.02 and 0.24 conﬁrming that issuers have higher market exposure
than their matches. By construction, SMB and HML exposure is relatively
low and with varying sign. RMW exposure is almost always negative and
signiﬁcant as one would expect because issuers tend to have low proﬁtabil-
ity. CMA exposure has varying sign and is often insigniﬁcant. In aggregate,
the results obtained using long-short matched portfolios conﬁrm the ﬁndings
reported in previous sections.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
7 Conclusions
Firms which issue new equity in seasoned equity oﬀerings subsequently have
lower returns than other ﬁrms. This is partly explained by exposure to factors
beyond the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, in particular negative
exposure to the proﬁtability RMW factor of Fama and French (2015). Some
signiﬁcant underperformance remains unexplained. I investigate whether this
can be explained by exploitation of information asymmetry by opportunistic
issuers, as suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1995).
If this explanation holds, one would expect that the most overvalued
issuers, and those which are least constrained in the sense, that they do not
need to issue to continue operations or service current debt, have the best
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opportunities to exploit temporary windows of mispricing. Therefore, issuers
with these characteristics should experience the lowest risk-adjusted returns
subsequent to SEOs. However, I ﬁnd no empirical support for this, because
the most overvalued issuers and the least constrained issuers, which are most
likely to be opportunistic, do not underperform relative to other issuers.
One may be concerned, that this result is due to inadequate proxies for
overvaluation and constrainedness. This is a valid critique in the context
of overvaluation. For obvious reasons, overvaluation is hard to detect, and
there is no consensus on how to measure it in the literature. Constrainedness
is easier to identify. Here a concern is that the most constrained issuers, on
average, share other characteristics which predict low return. I address this
issue, at least partly, by controlling for proﬁtability and asset growth. Even
with these controls, there is no evidence of lower returns for ﬁrms with more
room to decide whether and when to issue.
If there is no evidence of information asymmetry as explanation for long-
run performance of SEO ﬁrms, it is natural to consider, that information
asymmetry may be low at event time. From an empirical point of view, this
seems reasonable, because of the information requirements on issuing ﬁrms
and the incentives of issuers, investors, and intermediaries. If information
asymmetry is low, a possible explanation for the low returns subsequent
to SEOs is, that the marginal investor does not fully utilize all available
information. Empirically, I ﬁnd that event returns, and in particular negative
event returns, are signiﬁcantly related to issuer long-run returns. This result
is consistent with the hypothesis, that investors underreact to information
available at event time.
While issuer overvaluation, measured as issuer abnormal return prior to
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issue, is not associated with long-run negative abnormal return, high market
valuation is associated with low returns post issue. High market valuations
may be interpreted as low required return or as marketwide overvaluation.
In either case, ﬁrms which issue when stocks are particularly expensive, sub-
sequently have particularly low returns.
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Figure 1: The issuance decision when ﬁrm management know the per share
value of assets in place a and the investment opportunity b and investors only
know the distribution of these (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The ﬁrm issue if
(a, b) ∈M ′, the upper-left region and do not issue otherwise. The issue price
is P ′. MM show that the boundary between M and M ′ is given by the line
b = (E/P ′)a − E, where E is the per share equity to be raised to pursue
the investment opportunity. The dotted investor indiﬀerence line a+ b = P ′
marks the boundary between the realizations of (a, b) where investors get a
good deal and a bad deal. If investors have rational expectations, they, on
average, purchase equity at its fundamental value, i.e. in equilibrium P ′ must
be the expected value of a + b conditioned on (a, b) ∈ M ′. If investors have
less than rational expectations, i.e. the marginal investor does not fully
account for the impact of the informations asymmetry, P ′ and the dotted
line will be shifted to the right and the expected value of a + b conditioned
on (a, b) ∈ M ′ will be less than P ′ reﬂecting an average post-issue negative
return to investors.
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Figure 2: Trailing 12-months number of issuers (left axis) and trailing 12-
months market excess return (right axis). The correlation is 0.4 (t-value 9.1).
The sample of issuers has been ﬁltered, as described in Section 3.
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Figure 3: Average cumulated daily abnormal returns (calculated using
CAPM as market model) from 20 trading days before announcement to 20
trading days after announcement.
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Figure 4: Average abnormal return index (calculated using CAPM, FF3 and
FF5 as market models) from 12 months before announcement to 36 months
after announcement, normalized at 100 on announcement day.
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Figure 5: Return index of an equally weighted monthly rebalanced issuer
portfolios and for the market portfolio normalized at 100 on January 1,
1980. Issuers are included in the issuer portfolio from the second month
after announcement and remain in the portfolio for one, two and three years,
respectively.
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Figure 6: Cumulated return of a self-ﬁnancing long-short, equally weighted,
monthly updated long-short portfolio of SEO ﬁrms matched with non-SEO
ﬁrms. Issuers and their matches are included in the issuer portfolio from the
second month after announcement and remain in the portfolio for one, two
and three years, respectively.
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Table 2: Average Fama-French ﬁve factor loadings of issuers before and af-
ter issue. Loadings are estimated using daily excess returns with three lags
(the Dimson (1979) method). Before issue estimates are calculated from
12 months before announcement to one month before announcement while
the after issue estimates are calculated using data from one month after an-
nouncement to 12 months after announcement. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. * indicates signiﬁcance on a 10% level, ** on a 5% level, and
*** on a 1% level.
Before issue After issue Change
βˆMkt 1.10*** 1.13*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
βˆSMB 0.81*** 0.76*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
βˆHML -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
βˆCMA -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
βˆRMW -0.31*** -0.40*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
N 9344 10362
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Table 3: Deﬁnition of proxies for defensive issuers. In all cases, issuers with
lower values are more defensive because they have less cash, lower operating
cashﬂows, no long-term debt or do not pay dividends.
Variable Explanation Average Std. dev.
CR Cash ratio. Ratio between cash and current 3.01 2.15
debt (projected on [0, 5])
CR1 0 if CR < 1, otherwise 1 0.68 0.47
CCR Cash and cashﬂow ratio. Ratio between cash 2.66 3.24
plus operating cashﬂow to current debt
(projected on [−5, 5])
CCR1 0 if CCR < 1, otherwise 1 0.73 0.44
CFY Cash Flow Yield. Ratio between operating 0.04 0.20
cashﬂow and market value
PosCF 0 if operating cashﬂow negative, otherwise 1 0.68 0.47
LTDebt 0 if no long-term debt, otherwise 1 0.85 0.36
PosDiv 0 if not dividend paying, otherwise 1 0.38 0.49
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Table 5: Buy and hold abnormal returns from one month after announce-
ment to one year (Panel A), two years (Panel B) and three years (Panel
C) after announcement, in percent, regressed on past years' market excess
return r−n yearMkt , n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, past years issuer abnormal return r−n yearabn,FF5,
n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, event abnormal return reventabn,FF5, the positive component of
event abnormal return revent+abn,FF5, the negative component of event abnormal
return revent−abn,FF5, log relative issue size issue, and log market value mv, Past
year market and abnormal return are calculated from 12, 24, and 36 months
before announcement to one month before announcement. Return after an-
nouncement is calculated from one month after announcement to 12, 24 and
36 months after announcement, respectively. Abnormal returns are calcu-
lated relative to the FF5 market model. All regressors, except for revent+abn
and revent+abn , are normalized (z-scores). r
event+
abn and r
event+
abn is the positive and
negative, respectively, component of the normalized reventabn to make them nu-
merically comparable to reventabn . Newey-West standard errors calculated with
ten lags are reported in parenthesis. * indicates signiﬁcance on a 10% level,
** on a 5% level, and *** on a 1% level.
Panel A. One-year abnormal return BHAR1yearFF5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.12 -0.11 0.11 1.59
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.74) (0.77) (0.68) (1.06)
r−1yearMkt -0.15 0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15
(0.62) (0.66) (0.69) (0.62) (0.62)
r−2yearMkt -0.17
(0.68)
r−3yearMkt 0.97
(0.74)
r−1yearabn,FF5 2.93*** 2.91*** 2.88*** 2.93*** 2.99***
(0.90) (0.90) (0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
r−2yearabn,FF5 2.46***
(0.85)
r−3yearabn,FF5 0.99
(0.89)
reventabn,FF5 2.67**
(1.26)
revent+abn,FF5 1.72
(2.46)
revent−abn,FF5 -3.55***
(1.29)
issue -1.09 -1.08
(0.81) (0.81)
mv 3.14*** 3.02***
(0.65) (0.66)
N 8649 8649 8649 7310 6389 8649 8649
Adj. R2 (%) 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.84 0.85
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Panel B. Two-years abnormal return BHAR2yearFF5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -4.33*** -4.44*** -4.37*** -4.78*** -5.22*** -4.55*** -1.63
(1.36) (1.36) (1.38) (1.36) (1.34) (1.35) (1.76)
r−1yearMkt -2.36** -1.82 -2.18* -2.11* -2.38**
(1.19) (1.22) (1.23) (1.19) (1.18)
r−2yearMkt -3.37**
(1.34)
r−3yearMkt -2.13
(1.69)
r−1yearabn,FF5 4.89*** 4.65*** 4.68*** 4.96*** 5.13***
(1.34) (1.34) (1.35) (1.32) (1.33)
r−2yearabn,FF5 1.98
(1.32)
r−3yearabn,FF5 -0.13
(1.65)
reventabn,FF5 3.10**
(1.54)
revent−abn,FF5 0.12
(1.85)
revent+abn,FF5 -5.92***
(2.22)
issue -2.83** -2.80**
(1.43) (1.42)
mv 5.92*** 5.57***
(1.20) (1.21)
N 8242 8242 8242 6979 6102 8242 8242
Adj. R2 (%) 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.74 0.78
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Panel C. Three-years abnormal return BHAR3yearFF5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -11.49*** -11.67*** -11.49*** -12.70*** -12.22*** -11.81*** -7.35***
(1.88) (1.88) (1.89) (1.91) (1.98) (1.87) (2.28)
r−1yearMkt -5.06*** -4.34*** -4.21** -4.58*** -5.08***
(1.55) (1.59) (1.65) (1.56) (1.57)
r−2yearMkt -6.02***
(1.87)
r−3yearMkt -2.65
(2.12)
r−1yearabn,FF5 6.10*** 5.56*** 5.55*** 6.21*** 6.55***
(1.75) (1.76) (1.77) (1.70) (1.72)
r−2yearabn,FF5 1.51
(1.61)
r−3yearabn,FF5 0.95
(1.91)
reventabn,FF5 3.73*
(2.19)
revent+abn,FF5 -1.29
(2.16)
revent−abn,FF5 -8.61***
(3.19)
issue -4.34*** -4.26***
(1.42) (1.40)
mv 8.69*** 8.11***
(1.67) (1.66)
N 7759 7759 7759 6574 5761 7759 7759
Adj. R2 (%) 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.94 1.02
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Table 7: Monthly excess return of equally weighted portfolio of issuers re-
gressed on factor returns from January 1980 to December 2015. Issuers are
included in the portfolio for one year (Panel A), two years (Panel B) and
three years (Panel C) starting the second month after announcement. * in-
dicates signiﬁcance on a 10% level, ** on a 5% level, and *** on a 1% level.
Panel A. One-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.44*** -0.35*** -0.15 -0.10
(0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Mkt-Rf 1.41*** 1.25*** 1.18*** 1.17***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.76***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HML -0.28*** -0.09* -0.16***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
RMW -0.27*** -0.23***
(0.05) (0.05)
CMA -0.37*** -0.31***
(0.07) (0.07)
WML -0.10***
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 78.43 91.02 92.04 92.37
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Panel B. Two-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.55*** -0.49*** -0.27*** -0.14
(0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Mkt-Rf 1.37*** 1.23*** 1.15*** 1.13***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.74***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
HML -0.23*** 0.00 -0.15***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
RMW -0.26*** -0.19***
(0.05) (0.04)
CMA -0.46*** -0.33***
(0.07) (0.06)
WML -0.21***
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 78.90 90.49 91.83 93.56
Panel C. Three-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.25** -0.10
(0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Mkt-Rf 1.34*** 1.22*** 1.15*** 1.12***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.73***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
HML -0.14*** 0.05 -0.13***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
RMW -0.27*** -0.18***
(0.05) (0.04)
CMA -0.37*** -0.21***
(0.07) (0.06)
WML -0.26***
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 78.96 89.96 91.11 93.87
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Table 8: Monthly excess return of an equally weighted portfolio of issuers
regressed on factor returns and excess market return over the past year ex-
cluding the last month r−1yearMkt from January 1980 to December 2015. Issuers
are included in the portfolio for one, two and three years starting the second
month after announcement. * indicates signiﬁcance on a 10% level, ** on a
5% level, and *** on a 1% level.
Holding period 1 year 2 years 3 years
Intercept -0.04 -0.14 -0.08
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Mkt-Rf 1.18*** 1.15*** 1.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.69***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HML -0.08* 0.01 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
RMW -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
CMA -0.38*** -0.47*** -0.38***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
r−1yearMkt -0.014** -0.016*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Adj. R2 (%) 92.14 91.97 91.36
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Table 10: Monthly excess return of equally weighted portfolio of issuers re-
gressed on factor returns from January 1980 to December 2015. Issuers are
included in the portfolio for one year (Panel A), two years (Panel B) and
three years (Panel C) starting the second month after announcement. * in-
dicates signiﬁcance on a 10% level, ** on a 5% level, and *** on a 1% level.
Panel A. One-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.27*** -0.21** -0.12 -0.19*
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Mkt-Rf 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
SMB 0.02 -0.03 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HML -0.16*** -0.12** -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
RMW -0.17*** -0.22***
(0.05) (0.05)
CMA -0.05 -0.12
(0.07) (0.07)
WML 0.12***
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 10.81 15.05 17.66 22.60
183
Panel B. Two-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.22*** -0.24***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Mkt-Rf 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB -0.02 -0.05* -0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HML -0.17*** -0.10** -0.08*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
RMW -0.13*** -0.14***
(0.04) (0.04)
CMA -0.11* -0.13**
(0.06) (0.06)
WML 0.03*
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 10.98 17.15 19.83 20.34
Panel C. Three-year holding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.36*** -0.31*** -0.22*** -0.22***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mkt-Rf 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMB -0.03 -0.06** -0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HML -0.13*** -0.06 -0.06*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
RMW -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.03) (0.04)
CMA -0.13** -0.13**
(0.05) (0.05)
WML -0.01
(0.02)
Adj. R2 (%) 10.95 15.71 19.28 19.30
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